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IN THE BACK ALLEYS OF HEALTH CARE: ABORTION,
EQUALITY, AND COMMUNITY IN CANADA
Joanna N. Erdman∗
In 2002, the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada surveyed
Canadians on the sustainability of their universally accessible, publicly funded
health system.1 The Commission reported that Canadians “still strongly
support the core values on which our health care system is premised—equity,
fairness and solidarity.”2 Canadians believe that “equal and timely access to
medically necessary health care services on the basis of need [is] a right of
citizenship, not a privilege of status or wealth.”3 Unfortunately, health systems
do not exist in belief alone. For many Canadian women seeking to terminate
their pregnancies, access to medically necessary health care is, in fact, a
privilege of status and wealth.
In 1988, the Canadian Supreme Court struck down the therapeutic abortion
provisions of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional.4 An attempt to enact a
revised law was unsuccessful.5 Abortion in Canada is therefore no longer
uniquely subject to criminal restriction. Abortion services can be legally
integrated into the health system and governed by the laws, regulations, and
medical standards that apply to all health services. Abortion can be a health
service like any other, but it is not.

∗ B.A., J.D., University of Toronto; LL.M., Harvard Law School.
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appreciative of the warm welcome and guidance that I received from the wonderful reproductive and sexual
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1 See COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CAN., BUILDING ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF
HEALTH CARE IN CANADA (2002), http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/pdf/romanow/pdfs/HCC_Final_Report.pdf.
In 2001, Parliament established the Commission to recommend policies and measures required to ensure the
sustainability of Canada’s universally accessible, publicly funded health system. The Commission delivered
its final report on November 28, 2002. Id. at iii.
2 Id. at xvi.
3 Id.
4 R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 32 (Can.).
5 An Act Respecting Abortion, C-43, 2d Session 34th Parliament, 38 Elizabeth II (1989) (as defeated by
Senate, Jan. 31, 1991).
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Immediately following decriminalization, provinces enacted laws and
regulations that impeded women’s access to abortion services.6 All provinces,
with the exception of Ontario and Quebec, restricted or withdrew funding for
abortion under public health insurance schemes.7 British Columbia and Prince
Edward Island, for example, limited public funding to “medically necessary”
abortions performed in hospitals.8 Manitoba amended its health insurance
regulations to exclude “[t]herapeutic abortions, unless performed by a medical
practitioner in a hospital in Manitoba other than a private hospital.”9 Nova
Scotia and New Brunswick prohibited the performance of all abortions outside
of hospitals.10 Many of these laws and regulations were challenged on
jurisdictional grounds. Some survived scrutiny,11 while others were defeated.12
In response to invalidation, some provinces enacted amended versions of laws
and regulations to overcome courts’ objections.
The decriminalization of abortion thus ensured neither its availability nor
accessibility as an integrated and publicly funded health service. As of 2003,

6 Following decriminalization, Canadian provinces and territories regulate abortion as a health care
service pursuant to their primary constitutional jurisdiction over the administration of health care under section
92(7) (jurisdiction regarding the establishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals) of the Constitution
Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985), and sections 92(13) and
92(16) (jurisdiction regarding “property and civil rights” and “local or private” matters respectively).
7 MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA 292
(1989).
8 Medical Service Act, B.C. Reg. 54/88, R.S.B.C. 1979, ch. 255; General Regulations, P.E.I. Reg.
EC453/96, § 1(d)(iv) enacted pursuant to Health Services Payment Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, ch. H-2.
9 Excluded Services Regulation (Man.), Reg. 46/93, schedule H, § 28(a) enacted pursuant to Health
Services Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, ch. H-35; C.C.S.M., c. H-35, s. 113(1).
10 Under amended regulations enacted pursuant to the Medical Act, abortions performed outside of a
hospital constituted professional misconduct in New Brunswick. See Medical Act, S.N.B. 1981, ch. 87. Nova
Scotia prohibited the performance of abortions outside of hospitals and denied public funding for abortions
performed in violation of the prohibition. See Medical Services Act, N.S. Reg. 152/89, R.S.N.S. 1989, ch.
281.
11 See, e.g., Morgentaler v. Prince Edward Island (Minister of Health and Social Services), [1996] 139
D.L.R. (4th) 603, 609 (P.E.I.C.A.) (upholding a regulation that restricted public funding for abortion services
on the finding that the statute allowed the province to limit payment for medical services based on “the
circumstances of the performance of the services”) (quoting Health Services Payment Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. H-2
§ 5(s) (1988)).
12 See, e.g., B.C. Civil Liberties Ass’n v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 49 D.L.R. (4th)
493, 498 (Can.) (declaring a regulation that restricted public funding for abortion services ultra vires, and
“inconsistent with the statute, and with common sense”); R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, 464 (Can.)
(striking down the prohibition on the performance of abortions outside of hospitals and denied public funding
for abortions performed in violation of the prohibition as an indivisible attempt by the province of Nova Scotia
to legislate in the area of criminal law, a federal jurisdiction); Morgentaler v. New Brunswick (Attorney
General), [1995] 121 D.L.R. (4th) 431, 432–33 (N.B.C.A.).
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only 17.8% of Canadian hospitals provided abortion services.13 Less than 5%
of hospitals in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba performed abortions.14 In
2006, the New Brunswick hospital that performed 400 of the 404 publicly
funded abortions in 2005 announced that it would no longer provide the
service.15 Abortion services are entirely unavailable in Prince Edward Island16
and Nunavut.17 Where hospital services are formally available, access is often
restricted by quotas, gestational limitations, and mandatory family physician
referrals. These barriers contribute to longer wait times for hospital services.
As a result, at least in part, Canadian women are increasingly referred to or
seek abortion services from single-purpose clinics that function separately
from the primary health care system. In 1994, 32% of abortions in Canada
were performed in private clinics.18 By 2003, this figure rose to 46%.19 As
compared to hospitals, clinics are widely held to offer more supportive and
higher quality care. Unfortunately, clinic services are neither available nor
accessible to all Canadian women. Clinics do not exist in all provinces,20 and
even where clinic services are available, financial barriers often render them
inaccessible. With the exception of New Brunswick, all hospital abortion
services are insured under provincial health plans.21 The same is not true
respecting clinic services, which are partially or fully excluded under certain
public health insurance plans.

13 CAN. ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE (CARAL), PROTECTING ABORTION RIGHTS IN CANADA: A
SPECIAL REPORT TO CELEBRATE THE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF ABORTION 47
(2003), http://www.caral.ca/uploads/caralreporti.pdf.
14 Id. at 12.
15 Doctors Step in to Fill Abortion Service Void, CANADIAN BROAD. (2006), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/
new-brunswick/story/2006/05/25/nb-abortiondocs20060525.html.
16 Provincial hospitals stopped providing abortions before decriminalization. Since 1983, the province
has failed to report any abortions to Statistics Canada. MELISSA HAUSMAN, ABORTION POLITICS IN NORTH
AMERICA 2 (2005).
17 See CAN. ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, supra note 13, at 16; CHILDBIRTH BY CHOICE TRUST,
ABORTION IN CANADA TODAY: THE SITUATION PROVINCE-BY-PROVINCE (2006), http://www.cbctrust.com/
provincebyprovince.php.
18 STATISTICS CANADA, CATALOGUE NO. 82-223, XIE: INDUCED ABORTION STATISTICS 2003, 10–11
(2006).
19 Id.
20 Private abortion clinics do not exist in Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, the Yukon
Territory, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut.
21 See Medical Services Payment Act Regulation, N.B. Reg. 84-20, enacted pursuant to the Medical
Services Payment Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, ch. M-7. Under New Brunswick law, hospital abortions are eligible for
public funding only when performed in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy by a specialist in the field of
obstetrics and gynecology and certified as “medically required” by two medical practitioners. Id.
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Denied public funding for private clinics renders safe and timely access to
abortion services a privilege of wealth. The exclusion of clinic services from
public health insurance disparately affects poor and low-income women who
must return to overburdened hospital providers or delay receiving care until
they can obtain required funds. Delayed care increases the risk of physical
complications, psychological distress, and exceeding gestational limitations.
While denied funding does not necessarily prevent poor and low-income
women from accessing care, it does prevent their safe and timely access.
Denied access on the basis of wealth is, however, only part of the inequity.
Abortion is a health service that responds to reproductive and sexual health
needs distinctive to women. Only members of the female sex can become
pregnant.22 The exclusion of clinic services from a public health insurance
plan thus affects exclusively poor and low-income women. The inequity of the
exclusion resides at the intersection of wealth, sex, and gender.23
The conditioning of public funding on the place where a health service is
provided—hospital or clinic—treats abortion services differently than other
health services. Given the sex-specific nature of abortion services, its
treatment raises the specter of unequal rather than merely different treatment.
In other words, a difference in treatment that violates the equality guarantee
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.24 It is thus unsurprising
that the constitutionality of denied funding for clinic abortion services has been
the subject of a series of legal challenges across Canada. The governments of
New Brunswick, Québec, and Manitoba have all been called to account for the
different treatment of abortion services under their provincial health insurance
plans.
In New Brunswick, clinic abortions are excluded by regulation from
provincial health insurance coverage.25 Women in the province pay as much

22 See Nancy Krieger, A Glossary for Social Epidemiology, 55 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY COMMUNITY HEALTH
693, 694–95 (2001) (“[S]ex is a biological construct premised upon biological characteristics enabling sexual
reproduction.”). Reproductive capacity is not an essential biological attribute of women; in other words,
persons need not have the capacity to become pregnant in order to be recognized as female. Rather
reproductive capacity is distinctive to women insofar as only persons of the female sex can become pregnant.
23 Id. (“Gender refers to a social construct regarding culture-bound conventions, roles, and behaviors for,
as well as relationships between and among, women and men . . . .”).
24 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
25 See Medical Services Payment Act Regulation, N.B. Reg. 84-20, enacted pursuant to the Medical
Services Payment Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, ch. M-7.
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as $750 (CAN) for the service.26 In July 2003, an action claiming the
unconstitutionality of the regulation was initiated against New Brunswick.27
The case is still pending and is vigorously contested by the provincial
government.28
In August 2006, in Association pour l’accès à l’avortement c. Québec
(Procureur général),29 a provincial Superior Court ordered the Québec
government to reimburse almost 45,000 women out-of-pocket expenses paid
for private clinic abortion services between 1999 and 2006.30 During this
period, the province publicly funded physician fees but only partially covered
facility fees.31 While the Association pour l’acces l’avortement (Association
for Access to Abortion) argued that the public insurance plan was
unconstitutional, the Court decided the case on alternative grounds.32
In Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe I),33 the Court of Queen’s Bench of
Manitoba squarely addressed the question of constitutionality. The Manitoba
challenge concerned a provincial regulation that excluded clinic abortions from

26 N.B. Premier Says Province Stands by Policy Not to Pay for Private Abortions, CANADIAN PRESS,
Jan. 27, 2005, http://www.medbroadcast.com/health_news_details.asp?news_id=5827&rss=67&rid=999999.
27 See, e.g., Morgentaler Takes New Brunswick to Court over Access to Abortion, CAN. BROAD. CORP.,
Aug. 19, 2003, http://www.cbc.ca/news/story/2003/08/19/morgentaler030811.html. Dr. Morgentaler alleges
that Regulation 84-20, to the extent that it excludes abortions performed in nonhospital settings from the
definition of “entitled services” under the provincial health insurance plan, violates sections 7 and 15 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
28 Id. The claim further asserts that Regulation 84-20 is in conflict with the Canada Health Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-6, and the Medical Services Payment Act.
29 [2006] QCCS 4694.
30 The Association pour l’acces l’avortement (Association for Access to Abortion) initiated a class action
against the Québec government on behalf of “all women covered by the Quebec Health Insurance plan who
disbursed a sum of money in order to obtain an abortion in the Province of Quebec.” The Government of
Québec has not appealed the ruling of the Québec Superior Court.
31 Under Québec’s Health Insurance Act R.S.Q. c. A-29, the Régime d’Assurance Maladie du Québec
(RAMQ) reimbursed a total of $144 per first trimester abortion, which covers physician fees and $40 toward
facility fees. See also CAN. ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, supra note 13, at 29; Robert P. Kouri, The
Actualization of Reproductive Rights Through Access to Emergency Oral Contraception and Abortion in
Quebec, in JUST MEDICARE: WHAT’S IN, WHAT’S OUT, HOW WE DECIDE 168 (Colleen Flood ed., 2006)
(describing how facility fees cover expenses for drugs, counseling, nursing services, clinic administration, and
overhead costs, and how women in Quebec may access publicly funded abortion services through Centre
Locaux de Services Communautaires).
32 Association pour l’accès à l’avortement c. Québec (Procureur général), [2006] QCCS 4694. The
Court decided the case on the basis of statutory duties under the Quebec Health Insurance Act and related
regulations. Id. The Court also relied on article 1376 of the Civil Code of Quebec. Id. Given no evidence of
harm, the Court held that there was no breach of the Quebec Charter or the Canadian Charter. Id.
33 [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547 (Can.).
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public health insurance.34 Although the government opted to insure clinic
services while the challenge was pending35 and subsequently amended its
regulation,36 the government maintained that it was under no legal obligation
to do so.
On summary judgment, the Court disagreed with the government’s position
and affirmed that the Charter obligates the province to fund clinic abortion
services. Judge Oliphant held that the exclusion of clinic services from
provincial health insurance violated women’s fundamental freedom of
conscience under section 2(b) of the Charter; their right to life, liberty, and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice under section 7; and their
equality rights under section 15. He viewed a trial of the issues unnecessary as
there was “nothing more than a theoretical possibility of the Government’s
succeeding” in the face of such “a gross violation of the rights guaranteed . . .
by the Charter.”37 On review, the Manitoba Court of Appeal set aside the
judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench on the basis that this was an
inappropriate case for summary judgment and that a trial of the issues was
warranted.38 In February 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an
application for leave to appeal, thereby returning the case to Manitoba for
trial.39
The judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench in Jane Doe I nevertheless
remains significant in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. The court
affirmed that denied access to safe and timely abortion services is a violation
of women’s equality rights.40 A law that tells “every pregnant woman . . . she
34 See Excluded Services Regulation (Man.), Reg. 46/93, schedule H, § 2(28)(a), enacted pursuant to
Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, ch. H-35; C.C.S.M., ch. H-35, § 113(1).
35 Province Pays for Jane’s Clinic Abortions, CBC NEWS, July 8, 2004, http://www.cbc.ca/manitoba/
story/mb_abortion20040708.html. On July 1, 2004, the government began funding clinic abortion services
through the Winnipeg Regional Health Authorities.
36 As amended in November 2005, the Regulation provides that therapeutic abortion services, performed
by a medical practitioner in a facility approved by the minister, are not excluded as insured services. See
Excluded Services Regulation (Man.), Reg. 46/93, schedule H, § 2(28)(c).
37 Jane Doe I, 248 D.L.R. (4th) at 565.
38 Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe II), [2005] 260 D.L.R. (4th) 149 (Man. C.A.).
39 Id.; 2006 CanLII 5401 (S.C.C.) (Feb. 23, 2006) (No. 31225) (appeal denied). Given the Supreme
Court’s refusal to hear an appeal, the case was returned to Manitoba for trial. For a history of the procedural
developments in this litigation, see Supreme Court of Can., Information on Cases, Jane Doe 1, et al. v.
Government of Manitoba, http://205.193.81.30/information/cms/docket_e.asp?31225.
40 See Jane Doe I, 248 D.L.R. (4th) at 564. Although the violation of equality rights was argued in
Morgentaler, in which the therapeutic abortion provisions of the Criminal Code were struck down as
unconstitutional under the rights to liberty and security of the person, no member of the Supreme Court
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cannot submit to a safe medical procedure that might be clearly beneficial to
her unless she does so at a time and place dictated by a backlogged, publiclyfunded health care system,”41 the Court concluded, “is a gross violation of . . .
equality rights as guaranteed to women.”42 Unfortunately, Judge Oliphant
offered little more than this statement to support his finding. His reasoning is
at best gleaned from a recitation of the claimants’ submissions.
The brevity of Judge Oliphant’s equality rights analysis risks undermining
its significance. In an effort to protect against the risk, this Article seeks to
construct a comprehensive account of denied access to safe and timely abortion
services as a violation of women’s equality rights. This account is premised on
a model of equality that emphasizes the dignity of equal community
membership.
Equality rights, as guaranteed by section 15(1) of the Charter, are intended
to protect and affirm human dignity.43 A law thus violates equality rights if its
purpose or effect demeans human dignity. While human dignity encompasses
the values of autonomy, freedom, and self-determination, it is not confined to
these principles. Dignity also includes the self-respect and self-worth attained
through relationships with others and by the recognition of others. Human
dignity is demeaned when individuals and groups are marginalized, ignored, or
devalued as less capable, less deserving, or less worthy of recognition as
members of Canadian society. Human dignity, as defined under Canadian
equality rights, thus encompasses a sense of community; a mutual commitment
to treat individuals and groups as capable, deserving, and worthy of full and
equal membership in Canadian society. Membership in Canadian society is in
turn reflected by the legal recognition of individuals and groups as equally
deserving of concern, respect, and consideration.
Canada’s comprehensive and universally accessible health system—
premised on the core values of equity, fairness, and solidarity—is the
quintessential symbol of community. In the domain of health care, all
Canadians are supposed equals. Public health insurance as a legal institution
of collective responsibility and shared risk is intended to reflect equal concern,

commented on the impact of the law on section 15(1). See R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).
Moreover, the lower court that addressed Section 15(1) held that the criminal law on abortion did not itself
violate the guarantee of equality. See, e.g., R v. Morgentaler, [1985] 11 O.A.C. 81, 90–95 (Can.).
41 Jane Doe I, 248 D.L.R. (4th) at 562.
42 Id. at 564.
43 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 500 (Can.).
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respect, and consideration for all Canadians without discrimination on the basis
of status or wealth.
Consider therefore the effect on human dignity of restricting access by law
to a fundamental social institution of community membership, the Canadian
health care system. The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that when a
public health insurance plan denies coverage for health services that respond to
women’s distinctive reproductive and sexual health needs, women are not
treated as equal in the domain of health care. They are not equal beneficiaries
of a supposed comprehensive and universally accessible health system.
Moreover, given the status of Canadian Medicare as a right of citizenship,
provincial governments’ selective divestment from the health of women
implies a selective divestment from women themselves.44 Denied funding for
abortion services conveys the message that women are less deserving or less
worthy of public support and expenditure. Women are neither respected nor
valued as full and equal members of Canadian society.
Part I of this Article examines Judge Oliphant’s Charter rights analyses in
Jane Doe I. Access to abortion services historically has been protected in
Canadian law as a security of the person or liberty interest under section 7 of
the Charter. In Jane Doe I, Judge Oliphant did not stray from this orientation.
He decided the case primarily as a violation of section 7. In his section 15(1)
analysis, Judge Oliphant tethered his equality rights analysis to a conception of
dignity rooted in the liberty-based values of reproductive freedom, autonomy,
and self-determination.45 Part I is intended to demonstrate that the libertybased approach adopted by Judge Oliphant is ill-suited to the abortion funding
context. In an effort to offer an alternative approach, Part II develops a
conception of equality under section 15(1) based on the self-respect and selfworth—the social dignity—of equal community membership. This model is
developed with reference to the work of U.S. constitutional scholar Kenneth
Karst and his principle of equal citizenship. Part III returns to the section 15(1)
analysis in Jane Doe I to evaluate denied funding for clinic services according
to the proposed community-membership model of equality.
Part III
demonstrates that the exclusion of clinic abortion services from a universally
accessible, publicly funded health system perpetuates and promotes the view

44 See M. Giacomini et al., The Many Meanings of Deinsuring a Health Service: The Case of In Vitro
Fertilization in Ontario, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1485, 1497 (2000).
45 Jane Doe I, 248 D.L.R. (4th) at 564 (accepting the argument that limiting a woman’s autonomy
adversely affects women’s dignity and violates equality rights under section 15).
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that women are less worthy of concern, respect, and consideration as members
of Canadian society.
While this Article is primarily concerned with the conception of Charter
rights and their infringement, Part IV briefly considers how a communitymembership model of equality may affect the Court’s analysis under the
Charter’s section 1 Limitation Clause. Under section 1, state action that
infringes a right will be upheld as constitutional if the government
demonstrably justifies the infringement as a reasonable limitation in a free and
democratic society.
I. THE CASE OF JANE DOE 1 V. MANITOBA
In 2001, two women—Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2—commenced a class
action against the government of Manitoba. At the time the claim was
initiated, clinic abortion services were excluded by regulation as insured
services under Manitoba’s Health Services Insurance Plan.46 Under this
policy, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 both privately paid for clinic services after
learning of the significant wait times required for a publicly funded hospital
abortion. At seven-and-a-half weeks pregnant, Jane Doe 1 was informed that
she would be required to wait six to eight weeks to receive a publicly funded
abortion at a Manitoba Hospital.47 Concerned about health risks and emotional
stress associated with the delay, Jane Doe 1 paid $375 for a clinic abortion and
received the service fifteen days after her positive pregnancy test.48 Jane Doe
2 was similarly informed that she was required to wait four to six weeks for a
first appointment and that two further appointments were required before a
publicly funded hospital abortion could be performed.49 Fearing physical risk
46 See Health Services Insurance Act, C.C.S.M., ch. H35 (1993).
Insurance Plan provides:

The Manitoba Health Services

The minister may make regulations . . . for the purpose of [designating the benefits to which an
insured person is entitled under this Act in relation to services rendered by medical practitioners,
and respecting the manner of, and other details relating to, payments of those benefits to or on
behalf of insured persons], requiring as a condition of entitlement to receive benefits that services
be provided in a specified hospital or facility or any class of hospitals or facilities.
§ 116(1)(h)(i). The Manitoba Excluded Services Regulation further provides: “The following services are not
insured services: Therapeutic abortion, unless performed by a medical practitioner in a hospital in Manitoba
other than a private hospital licensed under The Private Hospitals Act.” Excluded Services Regulation, Man.
Reg. 46/93, § 2(28)(a), enacted pursuant to Health Services Insurance Act, C.C.S.M., ch. H35 (1993).
47 Jane Doe I, 248 D.L.R. (4th) at 552.
48 Id. at 551–52.
49 Id. at 552.

ERDMAN GALLEYSFINAL

1102

6/7/2007 9:56:02 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56

and emotional stress, Jane Doe 2 also arranged for a clinic abortion.50 Jane
Doe 2 was receiving social assistance at the time of her pregnancy, and
therefore a substantial portion of the clinic fee was covered through this
government program. She paid the remaining fees out of pocket.51
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 sought a declaration from the Court that the
exclusion of clinic abortion services from the Manitoba Health Services
Insurance Plan was inconsistent with and in violation of the Charter. Although
the provincial government opted to insure clinic abortion services while the
class action was pending52 and subsequently amended its regulation,53 it
maintained that the Charter imposed no legal obligation on the province to
fund the service.54 On summary judgment, Judge Oliphant of the Court of
Queen’s Bench declared that the exclusion of clinic services from public health
insurance was a gross violation of women’s rights to liberty and security of the
person as guaranteed by section 7, as well as a violation of the right to freedom
of conscience under section 2(a) and women’s equality rights under section
15(1).
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were not the first claimants to challenge the
constitutionality of denied funding for abortion services in the province of
Manitoba. They were, however, the first to do so successfully. In 1988,
following the decriminalization of abortion, the Manitoba Provincial Health
Services Commission amended its health insurance regulations to exclude
“[t]herapeutic abortions, unless performed by a medical practitioner in a
hospital in Manitoba other than a private hospital.”55 In 1993, Lexogest Inc.,
then owner and operator of the sole abortion clinic in the province, challenged
the exclusion as a violation of sections 7 and 15(1). In Lexogest Inc. v.
Manitoba (Attorney General) (Lexogest I), a majority of the Court of Appeal
declared the regulation restricting public funding to hospital abortion ultra
50

Id. at 552–53.
Id. at 553.
52 Manitoba
to
Pay
for
Abortions
at
Clinic,
CBC
NEWS, July
8,
2004,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2004/07/08/abort_manitoba040708.html. In April 2004, Jane’s Clinic Inc., a
nonprofit entity with a community-based board, purchased the former Morgentaler Clinic. On July 1, 2004,
the government began funding abortions at the clinic through the Winnipeg Regional Health Authorities,
allowing Jane’s Clinic to function as the abortion arm of a new and expanded Women’s Health Clinic. Id.
53 As amended in November 2005, the Regulation provides that therapeutic abortion services, performed
by a medical practitioner in a facility approved by the minister are not excluded as insured services. See
Excluded Services Regulation (Man.), Reg. 46/93, schedule H, § 2(28)(c).
54 Jane Doe I, 248 D.L.R. (4th) at 551.
55 Health Services Insurance Act Regulations (Man.), Reg. 506/88, schedule H, § 26 enacted pursuant to
Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.M. 1987, ch. H-35; C.C.S.M., ch. H-35, § 113(1).
51
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vires.56 While the Commission was authorized to exclude medical services
from the insurance plan, the Health Services Insurance Act did not authorize
the Commission to impose limitations or conditions on excluded medical
services.57 The majority of the court dismissed the Charter as having no
application to the proceedings.58 Only Chief Judge Scott, writing in dissent,
considered the Charter claims. He held that the exclusion violated neither
section 7 nor section 15(1).59
The Manitoba government responded to legal defeat in Lexogest I by
enacting the Health Services Insurance Act, which gave Cabinet the authority
to exclude insured services according to the location where they are
provided.60 Pursuant to this authority, Cabinet promulgated a new regulation
that excluded clinic abortions from provincial health insurance. Lexogest
again challenged the exclusion as a violation of equality rights under section
15(1). In Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (Lexogest II), the Court of Queen’s Bench
dismissed the claim because “the issue of whether the new regulation violates
[section] 15 of the Charter . . . is the same issue litigated and decided by the
Court of Appeal in the previous proceedings [Lexogest I].”61
The regulation that survived Lexogest’s second challenge is the same
regulation impugned in Jane Doe I. For this reason, the government in Jane
Doe I argued that the claims pertaining to sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter
had been previously decided. It thus sought an order that the statement of
claim be struck as an abuse of process, or in the alternative, that summary
judgment be granted dismissing the Charter claims. Judge Oliphant rejected
the government’s motions; a holding affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Both
courts held that the government failed to establish a prima facie basis for its
claim. Chief Judge Scott’s dissenting opinion in Lexogest I could not alone
ground an abuse of process claim.62 Given that Lexogest II relied on Chief
Judge Scott’s opinion in Lexogest I, it, too, was of no assistance.

56

[1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 562 (Man. C.A.).
Id. at 559.
58 Id. at 549, 555.
59 Id. at 547–48 (Scott, C.J.M.; Lyon, J., dissenting). On the question of jurisdiction, Chief Judge Scott
and Judge Lyon held that the Health Services Insurance Commission was authorized to exclude a medically
necessary service solely on the basis of its physical location. Id. at 540.
60 Health Services Insurance Act, C.C.S.M., ch. H35 (1993).
61 [1994] 91 Man. R.2d 260, 267 (Man. Q.B.).
62 See [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) at 561.
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Chief Judge Scott’s dissenting opinion is not, however, without value. His
Charter analysis is an important comparison for evaluating Judge Oliphant’s
sections 7 and 15(1) analyses in Jane Doe I. Despite their differing outcomes,
the judges’ approaches are more similar than different. Both judges
emphasized liberty-based values of autonomy, freedom from government
constraint, and self-determination in their analyses.
Judge Oliphant’s focus on liberty-based values also renders his approach
comparable to the opinions of the United States Supreme Court on the
constitutionality of denied Medicare funding for abortion services in Maher v.
Roe63 and Harris v. McRae.64 Maher and Harris tested the limitations of the
landmark 1973 decision, Roe v. Wade, in which the Court held that the right of
privacy “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”65 In 1976, following Roe
v. Wade, Congress enacted the Hyde Amendment, which forbade the use of
federal Medicaid funds for abortion services except when necessary to avert a
threat to the pregnant woman’s life.66 Under the Medicaid program, federal
and state governments share the cost of necessary medical care for many of the
poorest Americans, in particular indigent pregnant women and women who
receive welfare benefits on behalf of their children. In 1977 and 1980, in
Maher and Harris respectively, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Hyde Amendment and similar state funding restrictions.67 In both cases, a
majority of the Supreme Court reasoned that because a woman could access
abortion services with private funds, her constitutionally protected liberty and
63 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that a state Medicaid program that excluded all nontherapeutic abortions
from coverage but funded all childbirth related services did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1). This case was
decided on the same day as two other cases in which the Court upheld similar restrictions on funding. See
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 297 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
64 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that the Hyde Amendment, which at the time prohibited the use of
Federal Medicaid funds for abortion except when necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman, did not
violate the “liberty” or “equal protection” components of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution).
65 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that state criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only a
life-saving procedure on the mother’s behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Government may limit this right only where
regulation is justified by a “compelling state interest” and is narrowly tailored to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake. Id. at 155 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
66 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976) (applicable for fiscal year
1977). The Hyde Amendment came into effect in August 1977. Congress has renewed the Hyde Amendment
every year since, albeit with modifications either expanding or restricting the exemptions.
67 See Maher, 432 U.S. at 464; Harris, 448 U.S. at 297.
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equality interests were not impaired.68 The Hyde Amendment remains in
effect today and forbids the use of federal funds for all abortions except in
cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest.69
Drawing on Chief Judge Scott’s dissenting opinion in Lexogest I and the
opinions of the Court in Maher and Harris, this Part evaluates the strengths
and weaknesses of Judge Oliphant’s liberty-based analysis of sections 7 and
15(1). Access to abortion services historically has been protected in Canadian
law as a security of the person or liberty interest under section 7 of the Charter.
In Jane Doe I, Judge Oliphant did not stray from this orientation. He decided
the case primarily as a violation of section 7. Even under section 15(1), Judge
Oliphant tethered his equality rights analysis to a conception of dignity rooted
in the liberty-based values of reproductive freedom, autonomy, and selfdetermination. This Part demonstrates that a liberty-based approach is
especially ill-suited to the abortion funding context.
A. Section 7: The Right to Life, Liberty and Security of the Person
Section 7 of the Charter provides, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”70 In both Lexogest I
and Jane Doe I, the claimants relied on the majority opinions of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Morgentaler as the basis of their section 7 claims.71
Morgentaler concerned a criminal code provision that prohibited all abortions
except when performed in an accredited hospital and approved by a therapeutic
abortion committee as necessary to protect the life or health of the pregnant
woman.72 Unlike the justices deciding Roe v. Wade, Chief Justice Dickson and
Justice Beetz expressly did not decide Morgentaler on the basis of a liberty

68

Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–17.
See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION UNDER MEDICAID 1
(Oct. 1, 2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf. At present, thirty-two states and
the District of Columbia follow the Federal Medicaid law. Id. at 1–2. States may also choose to fund
abortions for low-income pregnant women with state funds in more circumstances than the Hyde Amendment
allows. Id. at 1. Seventeen states fund all or most medically necessary abortions; thirteen of these states do so
under Court order. Id. at 1–2. Courts have held that state constitutions and equal rights amendments prohibit
the exclusion of medically necessary abortions from medical assistance programs.
70 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
71 See Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (Attorney General) (Lexogest I), [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 523
(Man. C.A.); Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe I), [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547, 547 (Man. Q.B.).
72 R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 47–49 (Can.) (citing Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, ch. C-34,
§ 251).
69
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interest.73 Rather, the Justices reasoned that delays caused by the procedural
requirements of the criminal provision violated women’s section 7 right to
security of the person in a manner that did not accord with the principles of
fundamental justice.74
In a subsequent decision, Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights
Commission), the Supreme Court delineated “two requirements that must be
met in order for security of the person to be triggered.”75 Evidence must be
adduced of physical or serious psychological harm, and the physical and
psychological harm must result from state action.76 These requirements
represent the threshold inquiry necessary to establish a prima facie violation of
the right to security of the person.77 Section 7 further requires that the right to
security of the person be deprived in a manner that fails to accord with the
principles of fundamental justice.78 Given substantial barriers encountered at
the threshold inquiry, this Article will not consider the latter inquiry
(accordance with the principles of fundamental justice).
1. Physical or Serious Psychological Harm
In Morgentaler, Chief Justice Dickson introduced the first triggering
requirement of the right to security of the person: “State interference with
bodily integrity and serious state-imposed psychological stress, at least in the
criminal law context, constitutes a breach of security of the person.”79 As
subsequently elaborated by the Supreme Court in New Brunswick (Minister of
Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.),80 this requirement conveys
something about the degree or type of psychological harm necessary to
constitute an infringement of the right:
73 Compare Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 51 (Dickson, C.J.) (holding that “it is neither necessary nor
wise in this appeal to explore the broadest implications of [section] 7”), and Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at
113–14 (Beetz, J.) (holding that “it is nevertheless possible to resolve this appeal without attempting to
delineate the right to ‘liberty’ in [section] 7 of the Charter”), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding that
the right of privacy is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty, which is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy).
74 Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 79–80.
75 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, 344 (Can.) (holding that in the circumstances of this case state-caused delays in
human rights proceedings did not engage Section 7 rights to liberty or security of the person).
76 Id.
77 See id. at 339.
78 Id. (quoting R v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, 401 (Can.)).
79 [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 32.
80 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46, 56–57 (Can.) (holding that State removal of a child from parental custody without
the provision of state-funded counsel constituted a serious interference with psychological integrity, and thus
security of the person).
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For a restriction of security of the person to be made out, then, the
impugned state action must have a serious and profound effect on a
person’s psychological integrity . . . . This need not rise to the level
of nervous shock or psychiatric illness, but must be greater than
81
ordinary stress or anxiety.

The majority opinions in Morgentaler easily concluded that the delay
caused by the mandatory committee procedure had “profound consequences on
the woman’s physical and emotional well-being”82 that were sufficient to
satisfy the threshold requirement.
Their finding was supported by
“encyclopedic factual submissions” that established beyond any doubt the
harmful effect of the criminal law.83 These submissions included extensive
government-commissioned reports, such as the 1987 Report on Therapeutic
Abortion Services in Ontario (the Powell Report)84 and the 1977 Report of the
Committee on the Operation of the Abortion Law (the Badgley Report).85
In Jane Doe I, the claimants expressly asserted that the “delays . . . faced
by women wanting a [publicly funded] therapeutic abortion” caused physical
risk and serious psychological harm of a similar magnitude as described in
Morgentaler86 and submitted supporting personal affidavits and transcripts of
cross examination. Unlike in Morgentaler, however, no expert evidence
respecting either the relative safety of employed procedures or the physical or
psychological effects of delay was before the Court. Judge Oliphant
compensated for this lack of evidence by relying on the “statements of fact . . .
in Morgentaler,” which he viewed as “so powerfully conclusive that they are
beyond dispute”:87
I accept as a fact that depriving a woman of her right to decide when
and where she will undergo the procedure of a therapeutic abortion
threatens the woman in a physical sense and that the agony caused by
81

Id. at 77–78.
[1988] 1 S.C.R. at 57.
83 Id. at 56.
84 ONT. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, REPORT ON THERAPEUTIC ABORTION SERVICES IN ONTARIO (1987)
(Powell Report).
85 CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE ABORTION LAW
(1977) (Badgley Report). The mandate of the Committee was to “conduct a study to determine whether the
procedure provided in the Criminal Code for obtaining therapeutic abortions is operating equitably across
Canada.” Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to data from
Statistics Canada, the Committee conducted its own research, meetings with officials from the departments of
the provincial attorneys general and of health, and visits to 140 hospitals throughout Canada. The Committee
also commissioned national hospital, hospital staff, physician, and patient surveys.” Id.
86 Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe I), [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547, 556 (Man. Q.B.).
87 Id. at 562.
82
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not knowing whether an abortion will be performed in time is bound
to inflict emotional distress and serious psychological harm upon
88
her.

Later in the opinion, Judge Oliphant reiterated the seriousness of the
psychological harm and attributed it directly to the impugned regulation:
I am convinced that psychological stress is the almost inevitable
result when the impugned legislation forces women to wait for an
abortion funded by the Government at a hospital . . . . This stateimposed stress suffered by women who must wait for an abortion is,
89
in my opinion, serious in nature.

Judge Oliphant thus sought to compensate for the lack of an extensive
evidentiary record by accepting physical and serious psychological harm as the
inevitable result of the challenged law. Although the Manitoba Court of
Appeal did not comment on whether Judge Oliphant was entitled to take
judicial notice of the effect of delay, it did emphasize the inadequacy of the
evidentiary record in setting aside the summary judgment: “[O]ne would
expect the record to be based on viva voce evidence and be as ample as
possible to provide the necessary factual underpinning for these complex
Charter challenges.”90 In denying the section 7 claim in Lexogest I, Chief
Judge Scott seized upon the same lack of expert evidence to distinguish
Morgentaler from a case of abortion funding. He stated that although
“therapeutic abortions may sometimes be performed more quickly and
conveniently at the Clinic, there is no evidence in these proceedings that
women have had their health or safety jeopardized by delay in obtaining a
hospital abortion.”91 Noting Chief Judge Scott’s observation in Lexogest I, the
Court of Appeal in Jane Doe I concluded that “[t]hese important Charter issues
involve complex and developing areas of law which require a full factual
underpinning based on a trial record.”92
The type of expert evidence before the court in Morgentaler set an onerous
evidentiary burden under the threshold requirement of section 7. Comparative
expert evidence of the physical or serious psychological effects of delay
became a central preoccupation in the abortion funding cases. Since 1994,
88

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 563.
90 Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe II), [2005] 260 D.L.R. (4th) 149, 158 (Man. C.A.).
91 Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (Attorney General) (Lexogest I), [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 546 (Man.
C.A.) (Scott, C.J.M.; Lyon, J., dissenting).
92 Jane Doe II, 260 D.L.R. (4th) at 158.
89
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however, no Canadian government, either federal or provincial, has
commissioned a comprehensive study of access to abortion services.93 This
task has fallen to nongovernmental, privately financed organizations.94 In
1999, Health Canada tabled a report recommending that abortion surveillance
in Canada be conducted collaboratively with all clinics and hospitals in order
to improve the scope and quality of reporting and that particular emphasis be
given to the different components of access, including time, distance, and
availability of service.95 The 2003 Women’s Health Surveillance Report did
not include an expanded set of data on abortion service access.96 Given the
lack of government initiative in abortion surveillance and reporting,
Morgentaler may have established a burden of evidentiary proof that few
claimants, including Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, can satisfy.
2. State-Imposed Harm
The attribution of harm to government action poses a second barrier to the
effective application of section 7. In Blencoe, Justice Bastarache affirmed that
“a significant connection between the harm and the impugned state action [is
required] to invoke the Charter.”97 The facts of Morgentaler, he noted,
satisfied this requirement insofar as they concerned “direct state interference
with a woman’s bodily integrity in that the delays in obtaining therapeutic
abortions were caused by the mandatory procedures . . . of the Criminal
Code.”98 Throughout the majority opinions of Morgentaler, the justices
emphasized that the delay resulting in physical and psychological harm was
“caused by,” “created by,” “traced to,” or “attributed to” the procedures
93 The most recent provincial report was conducted in British Columbia. See B.C. MINISTER OF HEALTH
& MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR SENIORS, REALIZING CHOICES: REPORT OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA TASK
FORCE ON ACCESS TO CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION SERVICES (1994).
94 In 1998 and 2003, the Canadian Abortion Rights Action League (CARAL) conducted and issued
reports on access to abortion services in Canada. See NANCY BOWES, VARDA BURSTYN & ANDREA KNIGHT,
CARAL, ACCESS GRANTED, TOO OFTEN DENIED: A SPECIAL REPORT TO CELEBRATE THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF ABORTION (1998); CAN. ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE, supra note 13.
95 HEALTH CANADA, ADVISORY COMM. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH SURVEILLANCE, WOMEN’S HEALTH
SURVEILLANCE: A PLAN OF ACTION FOR HEALTH CANADA 70, 73, 96–97 (1999), http://www.
phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/whs-ssf/pdf/whs0200.pdf. The report explained that while data is collected in terms
of number of abortions performed, there is a lack of data from clinics, demographic information (who is
having abortions and why), on timing from decision to procedure, distance traveled to obtain services, and the
abuse that some women endure to obtain the procedure.
96 HEALTH CANADA, WOMEN’S HEALTH SURVEILLANCE REPORT: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL LOOK AT THE
HEALTH OF CANADIAN WOMEN (2003), http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/whsr-rssf/pdf/CPHI_
WomensHealth_e.pdf.
97 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Comm’n), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, 350 (Can.).
98 Id.
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mandated by the law “itself.”99 Chief Justice Dickson, for example,
acknowledged that the “[u]nfair functioning of the law could be caused by
external forces which do not relate to the law itself,”100 but in this case, “the
most serious problems with the functioning of [section] 251 are created by
procedural and administrative requirements established in the law.”101
The majority opinions of Morgentaler also emphasized the criminal nature
of the impugned provision—in particular, its prohibitive, preclusive, or
preventative character.102 Justice Dickson affirmed that section 7 is engaged
where “the administrative structures and procedures established by [section]
251 itself . . . in practice prevent the woman from” accessing timely services.103
The prohibitive character of impugned state action under section 7 was again
emphasized in the recent Supreme Court of Canada case, Chaoulli v. Quebec
(Attorney General),104 wherein a majority of the court held that a provincial
prohibition on private health insurance violated the rights to life and personal
security under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.105 In their
concurring judgment that the provincial law violated section 7, Chief Justice
McLachlin and Justice Major stressed the law’s prohibitive character: “In
Morgentaler, as in this case, the legislative scheme denies people the right to
access alternative health care . . . . [I]n both cases, care outside the
legislatively provided system is effectively prohibited.”106 Affected persons
“have no choice but to accept the delays imposed by the legislative scheme and
the adverse physical and psychological consequences this entail[ed].”107
The “negative” character of rights protected under section 7—freedom
from legal restriction or prohibition on life, liberty, and security of the

99

R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 59–62, 65, 71 (Can.).
Id. at 65.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., id. at 101.
103 Id. at 70–71 (emphasis added). In a later passage, Chief Justice Dickson expressly noted that “the
evidence establishes convincingly that it is the law itself which in many ways prevents access to local
therapeutic abortion facilities.” Id. at 71.
104 [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.).
105 Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., ch. C-12., s.1 (1975) (“Every human being
has a right to life, and to personal security, inviolability and freedom.”).
106 Chaoulli, [2005] 1 S.C.R. at 848 (McLachlin, C.J. & Major, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 848–49.
100
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person—was explicitly acknowledged by a majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General).108
Nothing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that [section] 7 places
a positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys
life, liberty or security of the person. Rather, [section] 7 has been
interpreted as restricting the state’s ability to deprive people of
109
these.

In Lexogest I, Chief Justice Scott relied on the negative character of section 7
to distinguish denied public funding from criminalization. Unlike the law in
Morgentaler, he stated, “the Manitoba regulation does not prohibit or restrict
abortions or mandate where they are performed. It merely deals with
payment.”110 Chief Justice Scott reasoned that imposing a positive obligation
on the state to fund abortion services “once a choice has been made by a
woman to terminate her pregnancy”111 was a novel application of section 7 and
would move the Court “beyond the judicial domain.”112
The logic of Chief Justice Scott’s opinion prevailed in the abortion funding
cases before the U.S. Supreme Court. In Maher, Justice Powell, on behalf of
the majority, distinguished funding restrictions from the imposition of “severe
criminal sanctions [that] . . . drastically limit[ed] the availability and safety of
the desired service.”113 He held that denied Medicare funding did not violate
the right of privacy insofar as the regulation
places no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant
woman’s path to an abortion . . . . [The state] has imposed no
restriction on access to abortions that was not already there. The
indigency that may make it difficult—and in some cases, perhaps,
impossible—for some women to have abortions is neither created nor
114
in any way affected by the . . . regulation.

108 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (Can.) (holding that provincial social assistance regulations that provided reduced
benefits to individuals under the age of thirty, unless they participated in training or education programs, did
not violate sections 7 or 15).
109 Id. at 491.
110 Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (Attorney General) (Lexogest I), [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 546 (Man.
C.A.).
111 Id. at 547.
112 Id.
113 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 (1976).
114 Id. at 474.
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In McRae, a majority of the Court affirmed the negative character of the right
recognized in Roe v. Wade.115 In upholding the constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment, Justice Stewart reasoned, in a manner akin to Chief Judge Scott
in Lexogest I, that a woman’s freedom of choice does not necessarily entail an
“entitlement to the financial resources to avail . . . the full range of protected
choices.”116 To the contrary, he explained that
although government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those
not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. The
financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s [access] . . .
are the product not of governmental restrictions . . . but rather of her
117
indigency.

Unlike in Morgentaler, the unfair functioning of the Hyde Amendment was
understood to result from an external factor—indigency—that was not
attributable to the law itself.118 The law did not prohibit or restrict access to
abortion.119 It merely addressed payment.120 Echoing Chief Justice Scott in
Lexogest I, Justice Stewart concluded that to translate a limitation on
governmental power into an affirmative funding obligation “would mark a
drastic change in our understanding of the Constitution.”121
The dissenting opinions in Maher and McRae adopted a very different
approach, rejecting as artificial the distinction between state-imposed and
independent or external barriers to access. The opinions focused instead on the
effect of the law as experienced by women themselves. In McRae, Justice
Marshall chastised the majority for avoiding “the undeniable fact that . . .
denial of a Medicaid-funded abortion is equivalent to denial of legal abortion
altogether. By definition, these women do not have the money to pay for an
abortion themselves.”122 Justice Blackmun similarly noted in Maher that “[f]or
the individual woman concerned, indigent and financially helpless . . . the
result is punitive and tragic.” 123 Regardless of its purpose or design, the

115

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
Id.
117 Id.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 301–03.
120 See id.
121 Id. at 318.
122 Id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 454, 462 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Maher and Beal were decided
together.
116
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funding restriction, in effect, impedes women’s safe and timely access to
abortion services. The majority justices in Morgentaler exhibited a strong
sympathy with this perspective. Justice Dickson insisted that “[i]n order to
understand the true nature and scope of [section] 251, it is necessary to
investigate the practical operation of the provisions.”124 The majority analysis
in Morgentaler was driven by “the perspective of the woman facing the health
care system, and not the criminal sanction.”125
In Jane Doe I, Justice Oliphant employed the same effect-based approach,
as used in Morgentaler and the dissenting opinions of Maher and McRae, to
attribute evidenced harm to impugned state action. Justice Oliphant did not
contest the characterization of the Manitoba regulation as merely dealing with
payment. Rather, he considered its practical effect from the perspective of “a
woman who wishes to have a safe therapeutic abortion without having to
undergo the physical risks and psychological harm associated with delay.”126
He asked: what is the effect of denying women public funding for safe and
timely abortions? What is the effect of requiring women to pay for the same
out of their own pockets? The effect of the impugned law, Justice Oliphant
explained, “is to tell every pregnant woman that she cannot submit to a safe
medical procedure that might be clearly beneficial to her unless she does so at
a time and place dictated by a backlogged, publicly funded health care
system.”127 The law “forces women to have to stand in line in an
overburdened, publicly funded health care system and to have to wait for a
therapeutic abortion, a procedure that provably must be performed in a timely
manner.”128 In simple terms, Justice Oliphant concluded, “delayed access for a
woman wishing to have a safe, state-funded therapeutic abortion is the result of
the impugned legislation.”129 An indigent woman has no choice but to accept
the delays imposed by the legislative scheme and the adverse physical and
psychological consequences this entails.
While an effect-based approach enabled Justice Oliphant to establish a
relationship between the harm and state action, it could not fully address the
Supreme Court of Canada’s equally important emphasis on the prohibitive,

124

R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 65 (Can.).
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, 849 (Can.) (McLachlin, C.J. & Major, J.,
concurring).
126 Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe I), [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547, 563 (Man. Q.B.).
127 Id. at 562.
128 Id. at 564.
129 Id. at 563.
125
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preclusive, or preventative character of impugned laws. While Justice
Oliphant emphasized the prohibitive effect of the law, describing the
legislative scheme as forcing women to stand in line or telling pregnant women
that they cannot submit to a safe medical procedure, the challenged law
remained nevertheless positive in character. It established the terms of a public
health insurance plan. The legislative scheme, it may be argued, did not deny
access to abortion services. On the contrary, it provided women with the very
opportunity to stand in line in an overburdened, publicly funded health care
system to receive abortion services. Without the public health insurance plan,
a woman seeking a safe and timely abortion was required in all circumstances
to pay for the same out of her own pocket. The legislative scheme thus
arguably facilitated rather than impeded access to abortion by funding services
in some circumstances.
The impugned legislative scheme violated section 7 only if the rights
protected therein obligated the state not merely to refrain from depriving
individuals of their life, liberty, and security of the person, but placed a
positive obligation on the state to ensure that individuals enjoy life, liberty, and
security of the person. Access to safe and timely health services is thus not
merely a privilege of government largesse but an entitlement of right under
section 7.
To date, however, section 7 has “been interpreted in a way so that
governments do not have a duty to provide publicly-funded health care.”130
Publicly funded health care is regarded neither as an individual right nor
government obligation. Jane Doe I is the lone exception in this regard, and its
standing remains uncertain following the Supreme Court’s more recent
decision in Chaoulli.131 In Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Health),132
for example, the British Columbia Supreme Court upheld the government’s
decision not to subsidize the costs of an AIDS drug treatment regime on the

130 Colleen M. Flood, Just Medicare: The Role of Canadian Courts in Determining Health Care Rights
and Access, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 669, 671 (2005). Donna Greschner similarly notes that “[t]he courts have
not interpreted the rights in section 7 in a manner sufficiently broad to encompass a general right to health, or,
except in exceptional circumstances, a right to access health care services.” Donna Greschner, How Will the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Evolving Jurisprudence Affect Health Care Costs? 9 (Commission on the
Future of Health Care in Canada, Discussion Paper No. 20, 2002), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/
pdf/romanow/pdfs/20_Greschner_E.pdf.
131 See Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe II), [2005] 260 D.L.R. (4th) 149, 156 (Man. C.A.) (“Chaoulli
was released after the hearing of this appeal, and we have not had the assistance of counsel on what, if any,
implications Chaoulli may have on the plaintiffs’s [section] 7 challenge in this case.”).
132 [1990] 66 D.L.R. (4th) 444 (B.C. S.C.).
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basis that section 7 does not guarantee benefits to enhance life, liberty, or
security of the person.133 In Cameron v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General),134
the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia similarly dismissed a claim under section 7
for public funding of fertility treatments. The claim was not pursued on
appeal. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Gosselin, the imposition of
a positive state duty is a novel application of section 7.135
Justice Oliphant neither acknowledged nor justified his novel application of
section 7 in Jane Doe I. The Court of Appeal seized upon this aspect of the
judgment as the second basis for setting it aside, noting that the “Charter
issues in this case are complex and involve developing areas of the law, with
important policy implications.”136 Following the release of Justice Oliphant’s
judgment, the Manitoba government emphasized these implications, describing
the decision as “reach[ing] far beyond the abortion debate . . . [to potentially]
affect the way governments handle long waiting lists for other procedures.”137
The government admonished that “[w]e can’t turn over to individual people the
planning of the health-care system, no matter how strongly we might feel about
their rights to the procedure.”138 A narrow interpretation of constitutional
rights in the health care context is routinely defended by evoking fears of
judicial meddling in the complexities of health budgeting and allocation, and
related concerns of institutional competence and political accountability. In
the words of Chief Justice Scott in Lexogest I, courts should not meddle
“beyond the judicial domain.”139
B. Section 15: Equality Rights
Equality rights can potentially overcome the judicial reluctance to impose
positive state obligations by distinguishing between rights to public benefits
and rights to equality in the distribution of benefits. In Maher, for example,
the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that while “[t]he Constitution
imposes no obligation on the States to pay . . . any of the medical expenses of
133

Id. at 467–69.
[1999] 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611 (N.S. C.A.).
135 Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 492 (Can.).
136 Jane Doe II, 260 D.L.R. (4th) at 156.
137 Press Release, Canadian Press, Manitoba Appeals Abortion Ruling to Protect Right to Set Spending
Priorities (Jan. 27, 2005), http://www.medbroadcast.com/health_news_details_pf.asp?news_id=5831&news_
channel_id=1000; see also Press Release, Government of Manitoba, Manitoba Defends Right to Set Health
Care Priorities (Jan. 27, 2005), http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/press/top/2005/01/2005-01-27-01.html.
138 Id.
139 [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) at 547.
134
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indigents[,] . . . when a State decides to alleviate some of the hardships of
poverty by providing medical care, the manner in which it dispenses benefits is
subject to constitutional limitations.”140 Justice Stevens drew heavily on this
distinction in his dissent in McRae. The government, he asserted, “must use
neutral criteria in distributing benefits. It may not deny benefits to a
financially and medically needy person simply because he is a Republican, a
Catholic, or an Oriental.”141 Nor, Justice Stevens reasoned, may the
government deny benefits to a financially and medically needy woman simply
because she seeks to terminate her pregnancy.142
By focusing on the equitable distribution of government benefits, the
dissenters in McRae, in the language of Seth Kreimer, respecified the
“acceptable baseline” against which to assess the effect of government
action.143 Unlike the majority of the Court, the dissenting justices did not
consider whether “the Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at
least the same range of choice . . . as she would have had if Congress had
chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all.”144 Rather, they assessed the
effect of the Hyde Amendment in the context of the Medicaid program to
which it was appended. Abortion was the only category of medically
necessary services excluded under Medicaid. Justice Brennan observed that
while “[n]on-pregnant women may be reimbursed for all medically necessary
treatments[,] . . . [p]regnant women . . . will be reimbursed only if the
treatment involved does not happen to include an abortion.”145 The
government, the dissenting opinions asserted, failed to use neutral criteria in
the distribution of public benefits and thus ran afoul of the Constitution.
The distinction between a right to health care and a right in health care is
well recognized in Canadian law. The objective of the equality rights under
the Charter is precisely to ensure that benefits and burdens are distributed on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Section 15(1) provides that
[e]very individual is equal before and under the law and has the right
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
140

Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–70 (1976).
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 356 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 See id. at 356–57.
143 See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984). “[T]he distinction between liberty-expanding offers and liberty-reducing threats
turns on the establishment of an acceptable baseline against which to measure a person’s position after
imposition of an allocation.” Id. at 1352.
144 McRae, 447 U.S. at 317 (majority opinion).
145 Id. at 331 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141
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discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
146
physical disability.

The distinction between a right to health care and a right to equitable
distribution of health care benefits is affirmed in Eldridge v. British Columbia
(Attorney General)147 and Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia
(Attorney General).148 In Eldridge, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
provincial government’s failure to fund sign language interpretation for deaf
persons when communicating with health care providers infringed section
15(1).149 The Court affirmed that “once the state does provide a benefit, it is
obliged to do so in a nondiscriminatory manner . . . . In many circumstances
this will require governments to take positive action, for example, by extending
the scope of a benefit to a previously excluded class of persons.”150 In Auton,
the Supreme Court considered whether a provincial government’s failure to
fund applied behavioral therapy for children with autism violated section 15(1)
on the basis of disability.151 As understood by the Court, the case did not
concern “what the public health system should provide,” but “whether the
British Columbia Government’s failure to fund these services . . . amounted to
an unequal and discriminatory denial of benefits.”152 Compared against a
substantive claim for public funding, Canadian law supports “a procedural
claim anchored in the assertion that benefits provided by the law were not
distributed in an equal fashion.”153
The claimants in both Lexogest I and Jane Doe I asserted that a denial of
funding for clinic abortions violated women’s equality rights under section
15(1).154 Chief Justice Scott and Justice Oliphant again reached opposite
conclusions on the claims, with neither justice fully articulating reasons to
support his holding. Chief Justice Scott provided a truncated equality rights
analysis rejecting the claim. Justice Oliphant simply concluded “that the
impugned legislation is a violation of the . . . equality rights as guaranteed to

146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

Part I of the Constitution Act, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, s. 15 (U.K.).
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (Can.).
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (Can.).
Eldridge, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at 624–31.
Id. at 678.
Auton, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 658–60.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 677.
See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
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women.”155 His detailed recitation of the claimants’ submissions, however,
suggests his supporting reasons.
The remainder of this Part examines Justice Oliphant’s equality rights
analysis under the section 15(1) analytical guidelines developed by a
unanimous Supreme Court of Canada in Law v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration)156 and adopted in subsequent case law. The
guidelines address three broad inquiries:
(a) whether a law imposes differential treatment between the claimant
and others, in purpose or effect;
(b) whether the differential treatment is based on a personal
characteristic associated with an enumerated or analogous ground
of discrimination; and
(c) whether the law in question has a purpose or effect that is
discriminatory within the meaning of the equality guarantee.
1. Whether the Manitoba Regulation Imposes Differential Treatment
Between Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 and Others in Purpose or Effect
Differential treatment under the law may result from either the failure to
receive a benefit that the law provides to others or the imposition of a burden
that the law does not impose on others. As described by the Supreme Court in
Auton, the purpose of section 15(1) “is to ensure that when governments
choose to enact benefits or burdens, they do so on a non-discriminatory
basis.”157 Section 15(1) claims are thus confined “to benefits and burdens
imposed by law.”158
In Jane Doe I, the claimants argued that the Manitoba regulation “imposes
an unfair burden on women by forcing them to pay for medical services to be
received in a safe and timely fashion as distinct from the rest of the
population.”159 Chief Justice Scott rejected a similar claim in Lexogest I. He
reasoned that because “[t]he impugned regulation does not deny women
coverage for therapeutic abortions, that are medically required,” women were

155

Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe I), [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547, 564 (Man. Q.B.).
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.) (holding that the Canada Pension Plan, which denied full entitlement to
survivor’s pensions to those under 35 years of age, did not violate Section 15(1) on the basis of age).
157 Auton, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 671.
158 Id.
159 Jane Doe I, 248 D.L.R. (4th) at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156
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not denied benefits or otherwise treated unequally under the law.160 The
Manitoba government adopted the same position in Jane Doe I. Under
Manitoba’s Health Services Insurance Act, pursuant to which the challenged
regulation was enacted, benefits are limited to “services rendered by a medical
practitioner that are medically required but does not include those services
excepted by the regulations.”161 The government argued that clinic abortions
are not medically required and thus do not qualify as benefits under the law. If
the service is not a benefit under the law, there is no entitlement to equal
distribution.
On the facts of the case, however, it is difficult for the government to
persuasively maintain this position. The Manitoba regulation does not
expressly deny funding for clinic services on the basis of medical necessity.
Rather, the funding restriction relates solely to the location where the service is
performed.162 As compared to hospital services, clinic services do not differ in
the treated condition, patient risk, or practitioner skill. In Manitoba, there are
no restrictions as to the “medical necessity” of hospital abortions.163 Nor does
the regulation provide exceptions for “medically necessary” clinic abortions.
Nonetheless, these difficulties are not fatal to the government’s position
given that medically necessary services can also be disqualified as benefits
under the law. Under the Health Services Insurance Act, “medically required”
services that are “excepted by the regulations” are excluded from the definition
of benefits.164 In fact, the Health Services Insurance Act was enacted with the
express purpose of providing Cabinet the authority to exclude otherwise
insured services according to the location where they are provided. The
government may thus argue that because clinic services are excepted by the
Manitoba regulation, regardless of whether they are medically necessary, they
do not qualify as benefits to be equally distributed by law.
In Auton, the Supreme Court of Canada considered a similar line of
reasoning in affirming the constitutionality of denied public funding for
applied behavioral autism therapy. Auton did not turn on the “medical
necessity” of the therapy. Rather, health services qualified as benefits under
160 Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (Attorney General) (Lexogest I), [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 548 (Man.
C.A.) (emphasis added).
161 Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.M., ch. H 35, s. 2 (1987) (Can.) (emphasis added).
162 See supra text accompanying note 60 (discussing Lexogest II).
163 In New Brunswick, for example, the government funds hospital abortions only when certified as
“medically required” by two medical practitioners. See supra note 21.
164 Health Services Insurance Act, R.S.M., ch. H 35, s. 2 (emphasis added).
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the impugned legislation only when delivered by a physician.165 Applied
behavioral autism therapy is not provided by a physician, and thus the service
did not qualify as a benefit under the law.166 The Court explained that
provincial health insurance schemes do not promise to any Canadian that he or
she will receive funding for all medically required treatment.167 Chief Justice
Scott in Lexogest I similarly remarked that a public health insurance plan does
not guarantee “equal access to all physicians regardless of location and
availability.”168 The benefit claimed—funding for all medically necessary
services—is simply not provided by the law.169 This reasoning leads to the
troubling conclusion in Jane Doe I that the exclusion of any service by
regulation under Manitoba’s Health Services Insurance Act is immune from
Charter review. In other words, where a differential effect results from the
designation of a benefit rather than its distribution, equality rights are of no
avail.
Given such an enfeebled interpretation of the reach of equality rights, the
Court in Auton acknowledged that the equal distribution of formally designated
benefits cannot end the inquiry. Equality rights under section 15(1) are not
confined to the “equal benefit of the law.” Section 15(1) also guarantees the
right to equality “before and under the law.” The phrase “under the law” was
specifically intended to expand the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of
the phrase “before the law” under the Canadian Bill of Rights.170 In Canada
(Attorney General) v. Lavell,171 the Supreme Court held that a law depriving
only aboriginal women of status upon marriage to a nonaboriginal person did
not deny women equality before the law.172 All aboriginal women were
deprived of their status, and thus all aboriginal women were treated equally.173
The Court accepted the definition of benefits and burdens as drawn and
inquired simply whether the law as constructed granted equal benefits and
imposed equal burdens on all persons to whom it applied.174 The Court
reasoned that while aboriginal women may not have been equal under the law,
165
166
167
168

Auton v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, 676 (Can.).
Id. at 676–77.
Id. at 673.
Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (Attorney General) (Lexogest I), [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 542 (Man.

C.A.).
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id. at 676.
Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 S.C., ch. 44 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. III.
[1974] S.C.R. 1349 (Can.).
Id. at 1373.
Id.
Id. at 1363–64
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they were equal before it.175 The decision in Lavell was heavily criticized and
formed the basis of a successful claim before the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations.176 To avoid such rigid formalism under the Charter, the
Court in Auton moved beyond the legislative definition of “benefit” to examine
whether the legislative scheme—the very categories of benefit created by
law—is itself discriminatory.177
In this regard, it is noteworthy that Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 made no
explicit claim to the “equal benefit of the law.” The claimants did not
challenge the equal distribution of benefits under the legislative scheme.
Rather, they challenged the legislative definition of benefits under the law—
the design of the insurance plan itself—as imposing an unfair burden on
women. In other words, the claimants in Jane Doe I sought “equality under
the law.”
As the Court affirmed in Auton, in designing a public health insurance plan,
“[i]t is not open to . . . a legislature to enact a law whose policy objectives and
provisions single out a disadvantaged group for inferior treatment.”178 Under
the separation of powers, the judiciary is thus tasked with the responsibility of
determining whether the statutory definition of benefits and burdens under the
law is a legitimate exercise of legislative power or the inferior treatment of a
group in purpose or effect. This distinction requires consideration of the
purpose of the legislative scheme and the overall needs it seeks to address. As
the Supreme Court explained,
If a benefit program excludes a particular group in a way that
undercuts the overall purpose of the program, then it is likely to be
discriminatory: it amounts to an arbitrary exclusion of a particular
group. If, on the other hand, the exclusion is consistent with the
overarching purpose and scheme of the legislation, it is unlikely to be
discriminatory. Thus, the question is whether the excluded benefit is
one that falls within the general scheme of benefits and needs which
179
the legislative scheme is intended to address.

In Auton, the Court reasoned that the impugned insurance scheme did not have
as its purpose the meeting of all medical needs. Its only promise was to
provide funding for core services, defined as physician-provided services.
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at 1367–72.
See Lovelace v. Canada, 1 CAN. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 305 (1983).
See Auton v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, 675 (Can.).
Id.
Id. at 676.
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Beyond this, the province funded services at its discretion.180 The Court thus
explained that because the health insurance scheme was “by its very terms, a
partial health plan . . . exclusion of particular non-core services cannot, without
more, be viewed as an adverse distinction . . . . Rather, it is an anticipated
feature of the legislative scheme.”181 To hold otherwise would effectively
“amend the . . . scheme and extend benefits beyond what it envisions—core
physician-provided benefits plus non-core benefits at the discretion of the
Province.”182 The Court therefore concluded that “the benefit claimed, no
matter how it is viewed, is not a benefit provided by law.”183
The same is not true with respect to clinic abortion services. The regulation
in Jane Doe I saddles abortion services, and by extension women who seek to
terminate their pregnancies, with a burden not imposed on others. While the
Health Services Insurance Act authorizes Cabinet to exclude services from the
insurance coverage according to the location where they are provided, Cabinet
cannot exercise its authority in a manner that arbitrarily excludes or otherwise
singles out a particular group for inferior treatment in purpose or effect.
Abortion services are the only medically necessary services for which funding
is conditioned on the type of facility where the service is performed. Clinic
abortion services do not differ from hospital abortion services either in the
health care need they address or the type of professional that provides the
service. Neither hospital nor clinic abortions are premised on the satisfaction
of any medical or other defined criteria. The majority of physician services
funded under the provincial health insurance plan are performed outside of
hospitals. All physician services, other than abortion services, provided in
clinic contexts are core services under the insurance plan. The exclusion of
clinic abortion is not an anticipated feature of the legislative scheme, but an
anomaly—a difference in treatment. The provincial health insurance excludes
women who wish to terminate their pregnancies in a way that undercuts rather
than supports the overall purpose of provincial health insurance.

180
181
182
183

Id.
Id.
Id. at 677.
Id.
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2. Whether the Differential Treatment Is Based on a Personal
Characteristic Associated with an Enumerated or Analogous Ground of
Discrimination
Equality rights prohibit, in particular, discrimination based on “race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.”184 In Lexogest I, Chief Justice Scott held without elaboration that
the “regulation simply does not discriminate on the basis of the grounds listed
in [section] 15.”185 The claimants in Jane Doe I emphasized the sex-specific
character of abortion services to demonstrate that differential treatment under
the regulation was based on sex, an enumerated ground of discrimination under
section 15(1).186 Justice Oliphant accepted their claim, noting that “because
women are the only persons who can access abortion services, any legislated
restrictions on women’s ability to access abortion services uniquely affects
women as opposed to the general population.”187 Moreover, the fact that not
all women are adversely affected by the Manitoba Regulation, or that some
women may even benefit from the exclusion, does not defeat the claim.188 In
Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.,189 for example, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that a company accident and sickness plan which exempts pregnant
women from benefits during a seventeen-week period discriminates on the
basis of sex. Writing for the majority of the court, Chief Justice Dickson
explained:
While pregnancy-based discrimination only affects part of an
identifiable group, it does not affect anyone who is not a member of
the group. Many, if not most, claims of partial discrimination fit this
pattern. As numerous decisions and authors have made clear, this
fact does not make the impugned distinction any less
190
discriminating.
184
185

Part I of the Constitution Act, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, s. 15 (U.K.).
Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (Attorney General) (Lexogest I), [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 548 (Man.

C.A.).
186

Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe I), [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547, 556 (Man. Q.B.).
Id.
188 As noted by Martha Minow, “Not all women, at all times, are pregnant; indeed, some women will
never become pregnant, and some who already have been never will be again . . . . Some women may argue
that health benefits for pregnancy are far less relevant to their needs than [other benefits]” such as home care
or pharmaceutical coverage, which are also excluded from provincial health insurance plans. MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 231 (1990).
189 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (Can.). Although this case was decided under the Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch.
H-6 (1985), rather than the Charter, the reasoning is equally relevant.
190 Id. at 1247; see also Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, 775 (Can.) (holding that childcare
expenses are not deductible as business expenses). In the United States, the Supreme Court refused to
187
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The disfavored treatment under the Manitoba regulation flows entirely from
the state of unintended pregnancy, a condition distinctive to the female sex.191
The fact that only women are affected by denied funding for clinic abortion
services is thus sufficient to ground a claim for discrimination on the basis of
sex.
3. Whether the Manitoba Regulation Has a Purpose or Effect that Is
Discriminatory Within the Meaning of the Equality Guarantee
In the first Charter equality case, Andrews v. Law Society of British
Columbia,192 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that “not every
distinction or differentiation in treatment at law . . . will transgress the equality
guarantees.”193 For this reason, “a bad law will not be saved merely because it
operates equally upon those to whom it has application. Nor will a law
necessarily be bad because it makes distinctions.”194 Persons differ in
important respects, and therefore, similar treatment regardless of difference
may exacerbate rather than mitigate inequality. Distinction based on claimed
difference has, however, historically served as the very justification for
marginalization and the imposition of disadvantage.
Unlike other judicial actors, the Supreme Court of Canada did not seek to
escape this “dilemma of difference”—that “stigma of difference may be
recreated both by ignoring and by focusing on it”195—through the criterion of
relevance. A law will not be saved under section 15(1) simply because its
objective is substantially or rationally related to an identified difference.
Rather, the court recognized that the relevance of a distinction often follows
necessarily from the characterization of a law’s objective.196 In Miron v.

recognize differential treatment on the basis of pregnancy as sex-based for the purpose of the equal protection
guarantee. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974). “While it is true that only women can become
pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification.” Id. at 496 n.20. This holding presents a major barrier for sex equality based challenges to
abortion restrictions under the U.S. Constitution. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
191 See Brooks, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1242.
192 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (Can.) (holding that a citizenship restriction on admission to the Law Society of
British Columbia violated section 15(1) and was not justified under section 1).
193 Id. at 168.
194 Id. at 167.
195 MINOW, supra note 188, at 20.
196 Denise G. Réaume, Discrimination and Dignity, 63 LA. L. REV. 645, 660 (2003).
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Trudel,197 for example, Justice McLachlin eschewed the arid circularity of
“relying on the formal test of logical relevance as proof of [equality].”198
Equality rights demand more than rational laws. Section 15(1) seeks to ensure
equality in the effect of laws.
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed in Andrews and Law v. Canada
that “[t]o approach the ideal of full equality before and under the law . . . the
main consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or the
group concerned.”199 Under section 15(1), a law is discriminatory within the
meaning of the equality guarantee if its purpose or effect demeans human
dignity.200 A discrimination inquiry thus seeks to determine whether the
distinction created by law demeans the human dignity of affected individuals
and groups. Differential treatment of abortion services under a public health
insurance plan, for example, constitutes discrimination insofar as the denial of
funding demeans women’s dignity.
Lexogest I was decided before Law v. Canada, and therefore Chief Justice
Scott’s equality rights analysis did not examine whether the Manitoba
regulation in purpose or effect demeaned women’s dignity. This inquiry,
however, was central to the holding in Jane Doe I. Justice Oliphant
characterized the discrimination claim in the following manner:
[T]he right to equality as granted by [section] 15 of the Charter was
intended to preserve and protect human dignity. . . . [T]he right to
reproductive freedom is central to a woman’s autonomy and dignity
as a person. The ability to assert that autonomy and to exercise selfdetermination regarding one’s own body is fundamental to the
preservation and protection of a woman’s dignity.
. . . [T]he impugned legislation limits and impairs a woman’s
freedom to assert her autonomy and to exercise self-determination
thereby affecting a woman’s human dignity in an adverse manner
with the result that it violates the right to equality as guaranteed by
201
[section] 15 of the Charter.

197 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (Can.) (holding that a provision of the Ontario Insurance Act that distinguished
between married and unmarried partners with respect to uninsured claims violated section 15(1) and was not
justified under Section 1).
198 Id. at 489.
199 Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 165 (Can.). (emphasis added); Law v. Canada,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 530 (Can.).
200 Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. at 539.
201 Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe I), [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547, 557 (Man. Q.B.).
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Judge Oliphant’s conception of dignity, rooted in the liberty-based values of
reproductive freedom, autonomy, and self-determination, again evidenced a
strong reliance on Morgentaler.
According to Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Wilson, the flaws of the
impugned criminal provision in Morgentaler extended beyond the physical and
psychological harm of delayed care. The mandated committee procedure
denied women the ability to assert their autonomy and to exercise selfdetermination regarding their own bodies. The provision, Justice Wilson
explained, violated the right to security of the person by declaring “[i]n
essence . . . that the woman’s capacity to reproduce is not to be subject to her
own control. It is to be subject to the control of the state.”202 Chief Justice
Dickson similarly located the provision’s flaw in its command to every
pregnant woman “that she cannot submit to a generally safe medical procedure
that might be of clear benefit to her unless she meets criteria entirely unrelated
to her own priorities and aspirations.”203
In Jane Doe I, Judge Oliphant emphasized women’s same loss of freedom,
autonomy, and self-determination. In consciously imitative language, he wrote
that “the effect of the impugned . . . Regulation[] is to tell every pregnant
woman that she cannot submit to a safe medical procedure that might be
clearly beneficial to her unless she does so at a time and place dictated by a
backlogged, publicly funded health care system.”204
It is Justice Wilson’s analysis of the right to liberty in Morgentaler,
however, that most strongly articulates a liberty-based conception of dignity.
Unlike Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Beetz, Justice Wilson held that the
impugned criminal provision violated not only the right to security of the
person, but also the right to liberty—a right “inextricably tied to the concept of
human dignity.”205 Justice Wilson reasoned that
an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter is
founded is the right to make fundamental personal decisions without
interference from the state. This right is a critical component of the
right to liberty . . . . In my view, this right, properly construed, grants
202

R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 173 (Can.).
Id. at 56.
204 Jane Doe I, 248 D.L.R. (4th) at 562.
205 Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 164. Justice Wilson also held that the deprivation of section 7 under
the impugned law infringes section 2(a) of the Charter, freedom of conscience and religion, on the basis that
“the decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is essentially a moral decision, a matter of conscience.”
Id. at 175.
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the individual a degree of autonomy in making decisions of
206
fundamental personal importance.

A woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy, she concluded, is a decision
of fundamental personal importance and is thus protected by the right to
liberty.
A liberty-based conception of dignity under the Charter is therefore defined
by the enjoyment of a degree of autonomy in making decisions of fundamental
personal importance free from state interference. This conception, as Justice
Wilson noted, is “consistent with the American jurisprudence on the
subject.”207 Respect for human dignity through the limitation on government
intervention reflects the very same negative conception of liberty endorsed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Maher and McRae. Charter rights, according to
Justice Wilson, “erect around each individual, metaphorically speaking, an
invisible fence over which the state will not be allowed to trespass. The role of
the courts is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters of the fence.”208
In the reproductive health context, women have greatly benefited from the
construction of a metaphoric space into which others may not trespass.
Religious, moral, and social codes have interfered for too long with women’s
reproductive decision making according to criteria unrelated to a woman’s own
priorities and aspirations. Nevertheless, as well recognized in feminist theory,
respect for human dignity requires more than freedom from the imposition of
others. The North American “language of possessive individualism”209 in the
abortion context “fails to recognize the inherently social nature of human
beings . . . [that] [w]e come into being in a social context that is literally
constitutive of us.”210 An individual cannot but make decisions, even of
fundamental personal importance, in a social context and through interaction
with others.
Justice Wilson acknowledged the importance of social situatedness with
her observation in Morgentaler that “[a]n individual is not a totally

206

Id. at 166.
Id. at 167.
208 Id. at 164.
209 JULIA S. O’CONNOR, ANN SHOLA ORLOFF & SHEILA SHAVER, STATES, MARKETS, FAMILIES: GENDER,
LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 52
(1999).
210 Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. &
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independent entity disconnected from the society in which he or she lives.”211
For this reason, she explained, a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy
often “reflects the way the woman thinks about herself and her relationship to
others and to society at large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound
social and ethical one as well.”212 In her study, Eileen Fegan describes the
“complex and contradictory feelings of indecision and determination, trauma
and grief, regret and relief” that has characterized Canadian women’s decision
making about abortion.213 Rather than freedom, isolation and the hardship of
responsibility define their experience.214 Women justify decisions to terminate
a pregnancy according to social norms, for example, deeming themselves
unworthy of motherhood.215 Fegan notes that “at an ideological (and
experiential) level, the construction of women needing permission for abortion
effectively outlasted decriminalization in Canada.”216 Rather than freedom,
social judgment and shame guide their decision making.
An equality rights analysis derived from a liberty-based conception of
dignity—respect for freedom, autonomy, and self-determination through
isolation from the influence of others—is thus terribly lacking. It diverts
attention away from the social context in which individuals necessarily act. It
obscures the ways in which social context can both negatively and positively
affect individuals by ascribing meaning to their conduct and the character of
those who engage in it. To the extent that laws regulating abortion services
express disapproval or condemnation, women who terminate their pregnancies
may internalize this view, believing their actions bespeak their low character
and thus their unworthiness of motherhood. Laws that integrate abortion
services into the public health system, regulating abortion as a health service
distinctive to women’s needs, support women who terminate their pregnancies
by fostering a belief in the importance of their health, their capacity as
autonomous decision makers, and most importantly, their dignity and worth.
Where the law challenged is one of exclusion rather than intrusion, human
dignity is respected not by isolation, but through support and inclusion. In an
effort to reorient the equality analysis under section 15(1) in Jane Doe I, Part II
211

Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 164.
Id. at 171.
213 Eileen V. Fegan, Subjects’ of Regulation/Resistance? Postmodern Feminism and Agency in AbortionDecision-Making, 7 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 241, 246 (1999).
214 Id. at 266.
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of this Article elaborates a social conception of human dignity rooted in the
self-respect and self-worth attained by relationships with others and the
recognition of others.
II. THE DIGNITY OF EQUAL COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP
Under the Charter, human dignity encompasses values of personal
autonomy, self-determination, psychological integrity, and empowerment, but
as confirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court in Law v. Canada, human dignity
is not confined to these principles.217 Human dignity also “means that an
individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth.”218
While values of self-respect and self-worth concern how “a person
legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law,”219 they are not
purely subjective. Nor do they simply “relate to the status or position of an
individual in society per se.”220 Rather, the Supreme Court conceives of
human dignity as an inherently social or relational quality.221 It concerns that
self-respect and self-worth attained through relationships with others and by
the recognition of others. Human dignity is “harmed when individuals and
groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws
recognize the full place of all individuals and groups within Canadian
society.”222
Supreme Court jurisprudence exhibits a clear continuity in understanding
equality rights as concerned with the relationship between individuals and
groups in Canadian society. In the first Charter equality case, Andrews, the
Supreme Court held that a citizenship restriction on admission to the Law
Society of British Columbia violated section 15(1).223 In defining an approach
to equality analysis, Justice McIntyre recommended that section 15(1) be
interpreted in light of the history of social inequality wrought by the
modernization and diversification of Canadian society.224 Justice La Forest
217

Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 530 (Can.).
Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Donna Greschner similarly notes that equality ought to be described as a “relational concept” rather
than a “comparative concept” insofar as it concerns people’s relationships with each other. See Donna
Greschner, Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?, 27 QUEEN’S L.J. 299, 316–17 (2001).
222 Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. at 530.
223 Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 157 (Can.).
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observed that “[o]ur nation has throughout its history drawn strength from the
flow of people to our shores.”225 Laws that unfairly exclude persons, he
reasoned, are likely to communicate the message
that Canadian society is not free or democratic as far as they are
concerned and . . . such persons are likely not to have faith in social
and political institutions which enhance the participation of
individuals and groups in society, or to have confidence that they can
freely and without obstruction by the state pursue their and their
families’ hopes and expectations of vocational and personal
226
development.

With the support of the full Supreme Court, Justice McIntyre concluded that
the “promotion of equality entails the promotion of a society in which all are
secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings
equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”227 A law breaches
the equality guarantee when it imposes “burdens, obligations, or
disadvantages . . . not imposed upon others, or . . . withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of
society.”228
In her dissenting opinion in Egan v. Canada,229 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
characterized the social equality envisioned by the Court in Andrews as a
recognition of and respect for human dignity. Equality, she concluded, “means
that our society cannot tolerate legislative distinctions that treat certain people
as second-class citizens, that demean them, that treat as less capable for no
good reason, or that otherwise offend fundamental human dignity.”230 A law is
discriminatory within the meaning of the equality guarantee to the extent that it
promotes or perpetuates the view that an individual “is less capable, or less
worthy of recognition or value as . . . a member of Canadian society, equally
deserving of concern, respect, and consideration.”231
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Id. at 197.
Id. (citing Kask v. Shimizu, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 154, 161 (Alta. O.B.) (internal quotations omitted)).
227 Id. at 171.
228 Id. at 174.
229 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.) (A bare majority held that a provision of the Old Age Security Act that
confined benefits to opposite sex couples discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. The legislation was
ultimately held constitutional, however, because Justice Sopinka found that the violation under section 15(1)
was a reasonable limit under section 1. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé issued an influential dissenting opinion).
230 Id. at 543.
231 Id. at 552–53.
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This formulation was later adopted by a unanimous Supreme Court in Law
v. Canada. Under section 15(1), human dignity is demeaned when individuals
and groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued as less capable, less
deserving, or less worthy of recognition or value in Canadian society. Human
dignity is affirmed by the promotion of a society in which individuals and
groups are secure in the knowledge of their full and equal membership in
Canadian society. In other words, the mark of membership in Canadian
society—of belonging—is equal concern, respect, and consideration.
Membership in Canadian society thus implies more than the status or position
of an individual in society per se or the interaction between individuals and
groups in a tangle of social relationships. It concerns a “sense of community.”
McMillan and Chavis define a “sense of community” as a “feeling that
members have of belonging . . . and a shared faith that members’ needs will be
met through their commitment to be together.”232 The term “belonging,” as
used in a constitutional equality context, is associated with the work of
Kenneth Karst and his principle of “equal citizenship” under the U.S.
Constitution.233 Karst’s principle of equal citizenship and the Canadian
Supreme Court’s conception of human dignity share strong similarities. Karst
wrote,
The principle of equal citizenship, as I use the term, means this: Each
individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized
society as a respected, responsible and participating member. Stated
negatively, the principle forbids the organized society to treat an
individual as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a
nonparticipant. The principle thus centers on those aspects of
equality that are most closely bound to the sense of self and the sense
234
of inclusion in a community.

He defined the essence of equal citizenship as
the dignity of full membership in the society . . . the principle not
only demands a measure of equality of legal status, but also promotes
a greater equality of that other kind of status which is a social fact—
namely, one’s rank on a scale defined by degrees of deference or

232

David W. McMillan & David M. Chavis, Sense of Community: A Definition and Theory, 14 J. COMM.
PSYCH. 6, 9 (1986).
233 KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989); see
also Kenneth L. Karst. The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977).
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regard. The principle embodies “an ethic of mutual respect and self235
esteem.”

Karst’s articulated principle of “equal citizenship” provides valuable
assistance in drawing out the “sense of community” or “belongingness” that
anchors the Canadian Supreme Court’s conception of human dignity. The
principle of equal citizenship akin to the Canadian conception of human
dignity concerns values of self-respect and self-worth. Moreover, these values
are understood to depend upon the respect and worth afforded by organized
society. It is this status—the presumptive entitlement to be treated as a
respected, responsible, and participating member—that marks a sense of
community. Karst further elaborates that “[t]he indispensable feature of a
community is the . . . sense that ‘we are all in this together’ . . . . Membership
in a community implies obligation to other members.”236 The dignity of equal
community membership is similarly informed by the Supreme Court’s
description of the macro-ethical character of Canadian society: the presumptive
entitlement to—an obligation of organized society to provide—equal concern,
respect and consideration. The equality guarantee is a commitment of equal
access to the opportunities, benefits, and advantages of full community
membership.237
This dignity thus embraces not independence, but
interdependence. As Karst notes, a sense of community “means not just
tolerance of deviance, and not just deference to another’s zone of
noninterference. It means treatment as ‘one of us,’ as a member of a national
community.”238
A conception of dignity rooted in equal community membership is valuable
precisely because it diverts attention away from an exclusive focus on the
individual or group affected by the law. The law itself becomes the focus of
attention as a powerful constitutive force of community, defining both
membership and exclusion. As described by Donna Greschner, the “language
of exclusion signifies something that is being done to a person by outside
forces. It is the system or rules that are wrong, not the person. . . . [T]he
language of belonging protects individual dignity by stressing the actions of
others . . . .”239 In Egan, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé similarly emphasized the
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See Karst, supra note 233, at 5–6 (internal citations omitted).
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237 For this reason, Greschner describes section 15(1) as moving toward a “full membership” model of
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importance of this perspective by observing that disadvantage “[m]ore often
than not . . . arises from the way in which society treats particular individuals,
rather than from any characteristic inherent in those individuals.”240 A
community membership of equality conceives of the law—the very structure
of the community itself—as a “source of the problem . . . rather than as an
unproblematic background.”241
Equality rights thus require courts to scrutinize exclusionary rules of
community membership that single out individuals and groups for inferior
treatment. Moreover, equality rights require that social institutions be
constructed as inclusive, rather than stretched in benevolence, pity, or
sympathy to accommodate difference. The Charter engages all public actors
in the long-term project of interpreting and enforcing equality rights in a
commitment to transform Canadian society “in a democratic, participatory, and
egalitarian direction.”242 The enormity of this task does not place it outside of
the judicial realm. Full equality can be progressively realized. Through a
consistent reframing of existing social institutions, including government
benefit programs such as public health insurance, a more inclusive standard
will emerge.
A conception of dignity framed in community-based terms may seem
counter-intuitive in the abortion funding context. Pamela S. Karlan and Daniel
R. Ortiz, for example, argue that restrictions on women’s access to abortion
services are commonly justified precisely by values of community obligation
and interdependence.243 Sidney Callahan, they observe, derives a “woman’s
moral obligation to carry her pregnancy to term” both from her status as a
human being embedded in the interdependent human community and her
unique life-giving female reproductive power.”244 Invocations of the term
“community” to support both restrictions on abortion and the funding of access
to abortion services, however, may signal divergent conceptions of the term.245
As noted by Jennifer Nedelsky, “[W]omen’s experience of relationships as
oppressive as well as essential has the virtue of making us less likely to be

240
241
242

Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 552 (Can.).
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(1998).
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romantic about the virtues of community as such,”246 but this is precisely why
“[w]e need concepts that incorporate our experience of embeddedness in
relations, both the inherent, underlying reality of such embeddedness and the
oppressiveness of its current social forms.”247 Equal community membership
is intended to offer one such model by demanding a mutuality of
responsibility: Women have obligations to the community, but the community
also has obligations to women as full and equal community members. A
conception of dignity as equal community membership demands that women
as community members have a presumptive entitlement to equal respect,
concern, and consideration for their physical and psychological integrity,
autonomy, and self-determination.
Part III of this Article returns to the equality analysis in Jane Doe I, but
seeks to evaluate denied funding for clinic services according to the proposed
community-membership model of equality. Judge Oliphant based his section
15 analysis on a conception of human dignity rooted in the values of freedom
and self-determination. Part III characterizes the Manitoba regulation as
violating equality rights on different terms: the law is discriminatory because it
perpetuates and promotes the view that women are less worthy of concern,
respect, and consideration as full and equal members of Canadian society.
III. THE INDIGNITY OF DENIED FUNDING IN CANADA UNDER A COMMUNITYMEMBERSHIP MODEL OF EQUALITY
In Andrews and Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed
that “[t]o approach the ideal of full equality before and under the law . . . the
main consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or the
group concerned.”248 Although section 15(1) is an “individual right, asserted
by a specific claimant with particular traits and circumstances,”249 the inquiry
into whether a law demeans a claimant’s dignity—the absence or presence of a
discriminatory impact—is assessed according to a subjective-objective
standard.250 The inquiry is conducted from the perspective of the claimant
taking into consideration “the larger context of the legislation in question, and
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[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 530 (Can.).
249 Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. at 532.
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society’s past and present treatment of the claimant and of other persons or
groups with similar characteristics or circumstances.”251 The discrimination
inquiry seeks to contextualize the impugned law to better understand its social
meaning. As Denise Réaume observed, “[T]he question of what constitutes a
violation of dignity is a normative question, not an empirical one about
psychological effects.”252 The application of equality rights requires courts to
interpret the message communicated by differential treatment and to assess
whether that message is one of exclusion and inferiority. Discrimination under
section 15(1) concerns the symbolic or expressive function of law.253 The
discrimination inquiry thus asks whether the law expresses a disapproval of or
increases social sanctions against persons or groups. It asks whether the laws
conveys the message that such persons and groups are less capable, less
worthy, or less deserving of respect, concern, and consideration as members of
Canadian society. The harmful impact of a discriminatory law is not limited,
however, to its expressive function—the message it communicates about
others. If the expressive function of a law is sufficiently powerful, its claims
will be internalized and accepted as true by its subjects. A discriminatory law
thus does not simply imply the lesser capabilities, worth, or deservedness of
others, but also it induces individuals to perceive themselves as such. A
discriminatory law affects self-perception—self-worth and self-respect.
A discrimination inquiry according to a subjective-objective standard
therefore requires that the larger socio-political-economic context in which a
law operates be examined. In Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court identified an
open list of contextual factors to assist in this inquiry.254 The following three
factors are relevant to an assessment of the law’s discriminatory impact in Jane
Doe I:
(a) Preexisting disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or
vulnerability experienced by the individual or group at issue.
(b) The correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground on
which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity, or
circumstances of the individual or group at issue.
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Id. at 532–33.
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253 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996) (“the
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(c) The nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned
law.
Guided by these contextual factors, the following analysis demonstrates that
the denial of public funding for clinic abortion services demeans women’s
dignity as full and equal members in Canadian society.
A. Preexisting Disadvantage and Prejudice Against Women who Terminate
Their Pregnancies
Preexisting disadvantage and prejudice against the affected individual or
group favors a conclusion of discrimination.255 In Gosselin, Justice McLachlin
explained that
[h]istoric patterns of discrimination . . . often indicate the presence of
stereotypical or prejudicial views that have marginalized [the
group’s] members . . . . This, in turn, raises the strong possibility that
current differential treatment of the group may be motivated by or
256
may perpetuate the same discriminatory views.

A law may have a discriminatory impact even if not expressly motivated by
contempt for the affected individuals or groups. Legal distinctions are often
mapped reflexively onto social constructions of difference historically used for
discriminatory purposes. As Justice Wilson noted in Andrews, “[T]he interest
of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked.”257 Preexisting
disadvantage and prejudice can indicate a longstanding failure of the legal
system to extend equal respect, concern, and consideration which the
impugned law by virtue of its same distinction perpetuates.
Preexisting disadvantage and entrenched prejudice are particularly
important indicia of discrimination in the health care context. In Eldridge, the
Supreme Court held that state failure to fund sign language interpretation for
deaf persons violated section 15(1). In demonstrating the discriminatory
impact of the law, Justice La Forest characterized the history of disabled
persons in Canada as “largely one of exclusion and marginalization . . . [and]
denied access to opportunities for social interaction and advancement.”258 He
concluded that “disabled persons have not generally been afforded the ‘equal
255

Id. at 534.
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257 Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 152 (Can.) (Wilson, J.) (citing JOHN STUART
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concern, respect and consideration’ that [section] 15(1) of the Charter
demands. Instead, they have been subjected to paternalistic attitudes of pity
and charity.”259 In Cameron, Justice Chipman held that denied public funding
for fertility treatments was discriminatory after acknowledging the “ancient
social stigma” of infertility as “an unworthy state, the object of derision,
banishment and disgrace.”260 The infertile, he observed, “have been and see[]
themselves portrayed as, having undesirable traits or lacking those traits which
are regarded as worthy.”261
Women who terminate their pregnancies, and those who provide abortion
services, have long been condemned under religiously guided moral codes. In
the nineteenth century, the moral prohibition against abortion became
enforceable under Canadian law. First adopted into the common law, abortion
was later criminalized under The Offences Against the Person Act262 and
eventually incorporated into the Canadian Criminal Code of 1892.263 Criminal
law is the classic institution of social condemnation, intended to express
disapprobation of the restricted conduct and of those who engage in it.
While morally motivated, the nineteenth century Canadian criminalization
of abortion also served the ends of a highly racialized natalist policy. Louise
Falconer associates the criminal restrictions on abortion with the rhetoric of
“populate or perish” then resonating throughout the British Empire.264 She
explains that as Canada’s birth rate began to decline at the end of the
nineteenth century, female reproduction became a matter of national
obsession.265 Abortion restrictions condemned white married women who
terminated their pregnancies not only for lack of morals, but for depriving
fathers of their sons and countries of their soldiers. These women were
perceived as neglecting their maternal duties to both husband and state.
Women’s sense of belonging in Canadian society—their respect and worth—
was intimately tied to their reproductive capacity.

259
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In 1969, an amendment to the Criminal Code created the therapeutic
abortion committee regime, subsequently held unconstitutional in
Morgentaler.266 Prior to this amendment, statutory law did not formally
express permissible grounds for the lawful termination of pregnancy. Courts
did, however, recognize a common law defense of necessity: An abortion was
lawful when performed in good faith to preserve a pregnant woman’s life or
physical or mental health.267 Rather than expanding permissible grounds for a
legal abortion, the 1969 Criminal Code amendment enabled the legality of an
abortion to “be established beforehand, by certification of a therapeutic
abortion committee.”268 In Morgentaler, Justice Beetz explained that the 1969
amendment was intended “to make therapeutic abortions lawful and available
but also to ensure that the excuse of therapy will not be abused.”269 The
committee regime ensured that only women “deserving” of an exemption from
criminal law were granted access to abortion services. Women were not
afforded equal concern, respect, and consideration. They were subjected to
paternalistic attitudes of pity and charity. Undeserved use—so-called abuse of
abortion—remained legally and socially condemned.
From the nineteenth century, private clinics were strongly implicated in this
feared abuse. Despite criminal prohibitions, clandestine abortions were widely
performed but not without significant costs.270 Many women sought services
from outside the trained profession and avoided medical care even when
complications ensued. For women with financial resources, private maternity
hospitals or “lying-in homes”—“believed to be (not unjustly in some
instances) rudimentary abortion clinics”—offered safer alternatives.271 The
activities of these institutions were well known in the late 1890s,272 and
provincial health legislation sought to regulate the activities of maternity
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Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, ch. C-34, s. 251.
Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Aspects of Abortion, in ABORTION: READINGS AND RESEARCH 16, 17 (Paul
Sachdev ed., 1981).
268 Id. at 18.
269 R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 88 (Can.) (emphasis added).
270 MCLAREN & MCLAREN, supra note 265, at 32–53.
271 Falconer, supra note 264, at 151.
272 Id. at 169. In Of Toronto the Good, C.S. Clark wrote that “[t]he many lying-in hospitals and
institutions for the reception of illegitimate children tell but a portion of the story, and it is probable that the
immorality that produced such results, widespread though it may be, is remarkably limited in comparison with
that which escapes detection.” C.S. CLARK, OF TORONTO THE GOOD: A SOCIAL STUDY; THE QUEEN CITY OF
CANADA AS IT IS 96 (1898).
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homes.273
Statutes required proprietors to “ascertain and record the
‘antecedents of women coming under their care’ and to furnish that
information as required.”274 As Louise Falconer observed, “The excessive
regulation of individual women, rather than just the institutions housing them,
is indicative of a broader agenda not inconsistent with either the moral reform
or pro-natalist movements.”275 Under the 1969 Criminal Code amendment, the
performance of abortions in settings other than “accredited” or “approved”
hospitals remained prohibited.276 Moreover, provincial ministers of health
were under no obligation to grant approval to any hospital.277 Private
institutions attracted heightened scrutiny throughout the history of criminalized
abortion as the location of clandestine services for undeserving and immoral
women. The legal exclusion of clinic services from public health insurance
continues to treat clinic abortions as a “moral hazard” in this double sense—
the danger that funding clinic abortions will encourage abuse and the poor
character of those who seek the service.278
Case law respecting similar provincial restrictions on clinic abortion
services supports this interpretation. In 1993, in R. v. Morgentaler,279 the
Supreme Court of Canada struck down a Nova Scotia act and regulation that
together prohibited abortions outside of hospitals and denied public funding for
abortions performed in violation of the law.280 The Court held that the
prohibition was an indivisible attempt by the province to legislate in the area of
criminal law, a federal jurisdiction. The primary objective of the law, the
Court explained, was “to prohibit abortions outside hospitals as socially
undesirable conduct.”281 The law regulated “the place where an abortion may
be obtained, not from the viewpoint of health care policy, but from the
273 Ontario was the first province to pass legislation specifically regulating the maternity homes.
Maternity Boarding Houses Act 1897 (Ont.). Manitoba followed suit with a similar statute. Maternity Act
1899 (Man.).
274 Falconer, supra note 264, at 172.
275 Id.
276 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, ch. C-34, § 251(4) [repealed].
277 R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 66 (Can.).
278 Hazel Glenn Beh explains that for nineteenth-century insurers, “moral hazard” represented an
unwholesome mix of bad character and temptation which the insurers had a responsibility to ferret out from
the insurance enterprise. Older policies excluding venereal diseases demonstrate the bad character aspect of
the “moral hazard” in health care insurance. Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure and Reproduction:
Health Insurers Don’t Want You to Do Those Nasty Things, 13 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 119, 127 n.42 (1998).
279 [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463 (Can.).
280 Section 91 the Constitution Act reserves legislative authority over the criminal law to the federal
government.
281 Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. at 513.
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viewpoint of public wrongs or crimes.”282 In Lexogest I, the first case to
address the exclusion of clinic abortion services from Manitoba’s health
insurance plan, the Court of Appeal declared the impugned health regulation
ultra vires.283 A majority of the Court held that the Commission which
enacted the regulation was not statutorily authorized to impose limitations or
conditions on excluded medical services. Justice Huband also addressed the
context of the regulation’s enactment and its ultimate effect:
I would be closing my eyes to the reality that exists outside the four
corners of the court-room if I failed to note that the challenged
regulation was passed immediately following the Supreme Court
decision in R. v. Morgentaler. The effect of the regulation is to
provide insurance coverage only for the patient who chooses to have
her therapeutic abortion performed in a hospital, as the situation
284
existed prior to the Morgentaler decision.

Given that for many women the denial of public funding is equivalent to a
denial of service, Justice Huband recognized that the law in effect restricted
women’s access to abortions performed in accredited or approved hospitals.
Through exclusion from public funding, access to abortion services in the
province of Manitoba was effectively returned to a pre-Morgentaler state of
suspicion, supervision, and restriction.
For almost one hundred and fifty years, Canadian women who terminated
their pregnancies were not simply the objects of derision, banishment, and
disgrace. They were a criminal class. These women were perceived as a threat
to morality, the family, the community, and the nation. Private clinics to
which women turned for care and support were viewed as dens of vice and
became a preoccupation of law enforcement. This pattern of prejudice and
disadvantage raises a strong presumption that the differential treatment of
clinic abortion services under the impugned law in Jane Doe I is motivated by
the same historic contempt for women who terminate their pregnancies. By
denying women access to public health insurance, the Manitoba regulation
perpetuates, whether by intention or not, a longstanding failure of the legal
system to extend equal respect, concern, and consideration to this group of
women. While criminal law may have been the mechanism of social
disavowal in the past, in the modern welfare state, public disapproval is most
282
283
284

C.A.).

Id.
[1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 562 (Man. C.A.).
Lexogest Inc. v. Manitoba (Attorney General) (Lexogest I), [1993] 101 D.L.R. (4th) 523, 561 (Man.
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effectively expressed through institutional exclusion and the denial of
resources.
B. The Lack of Correspondence Between the Exclusion of Clinic Abortions as
an Insured Service and the Reproductive and Sexual Health Needs of
Women
Legal distinctions do not necessarily constitute discrimination under
section 15(1).285 Rather, differential treatment can both exacerbate and
mitigate inequality. A discriminatory impact is therefore only ascertainable by
reference to the purpose and effect of differential treatment. Human dignity is
demeaned, for example, by legal distinctions which impose burdens or
withhold benefits in a manner that “reflects the stereotypical application of
presumed group or personal characteristics.” 286 Stereotypes are defined as
“personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs,
capacities, or merits.”287 The opposite is also true. Human dignity is enhanced
by distinctions at law that reflect sensitivity “to the needs, capacities, and
merits of different individuals, taking into account the context underlying their
differences”288 A law will thus likely be found discriminatory if the
distinctions it creates reflect stereotypes or otherwise fail to correspond to the
needs, capacities, and merits of affected individuals and groups. It is difficult
after all to demonstrate equal respect, concern, and consideration through
neglect of individuals’ needs, capacities, and merits.
Lack of correspondence between the law and the needs of affected
individuals and groups has proven a particularly important factor in the health
care context. In Eldridge, the Supreme Court reasoned that in hospital settings
where deaf persons cannot effectively communicate without an interpreter, the
denial of public funding for sign language services neglects the needs of deaf
patients, and thus denies them the same level of medical care as hearing
persons. The Court held that a failure to ensure deaf persons’ equal
participation in health care decision making violated section 15(1). In
Cameron, Justice Chipman drew attention to the fact that the impugned health
insurance scheme “denies to the infertile a major component of the array of
services available to ameliorate their condition. They are . . . denied a

285
286
287
288

Andrews v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 152, 168 (Can.).
Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 529 (Can.); see also Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 174–75.
Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. at 530.
Id.
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treatment which ‘may be the most significant for them.’”289 A public health
system that selectively denies funding for medical treatment identified by
affected individuals as most significant for them—such as infertility treatment
for infertile persons—sends a powerful message that their health care needs,
and by extension their improved health, is comparatively less important.
The Manitoba government sought to refute a similar understanding of the
challenged law in Jane Doe I by focusing directly on the question of health
care needs. Clinic abortion services, it claimed, were not “medically
necessary.” 290 The exclusion of a medically unnecessary service from the
public health insurance plan was a rational and fiscally responsible decision
undertaken to ensure the sustainability of the health system.
The
characterization of such exclusions as discriminatory and thus unconstitutional,
the government argued, “jeopardizes the province’s responsibility to determine
the most effective and efficient way to deliver health care.”291 Denied public
funding for clinic abortion services reflected nothing more than a concern for
the effective and efficient delivery of care.
The term “medically necessary,” which anchors the government’s position,
is defined in neither the Canada Health Act,292 which introduced the phrase as
the standard of comprehensive provincial health insurance, or the Manitoba
Health Services Insurance Act. In most provinces, decisions to insure services
under the public health system are undertaken by closed negotiation between
the ministry of health and the provincial medical association without reference
to any substantive definition of the term.293 Medical necessity thus functions
289

Cameron v. Nova Scotia, [1999] 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611, 661 (N.S. C.A.).
Press Release, Gov’t of Manitoba, Manitoba Defends Right to Set Health Care Priorities (Jan. 27,
2005), http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/press/top/2005/01/2005-01-27-01.html (“The effect of this decision . . .
suggests that everyone is constitutionally entitled to a health care service based upon the time of their choosing
without regard to medical necessity”).
291 Id.
292 R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-6 (Can.). The Canada Health Act requires that provincial health insurance plans
insure all hospital and physician services in order for provinces to receive federal cash contributions toward
their plans (s. 9). The Act defines hospital services as those services “provided . . . at a hospital, if the services
are medically necessary for the purpose of maintaining health, preventing disease or diagnosing or treating an
injury, illness or disability.” (s. 2) (emphasis added). Physician services are defined as “any medically
required service rendered by medical practitioners.” (s. 2) (emphasis added). The Act does not define medical
necessity or medical requirement.
293 Colleen Flood, Marc C. Stabile & Carolyn Tuohy, What’s In and Out of Medicare? Who Decides?, in
JUST MEDICARE: WHAT’S IN, WHAT’S OUT, HOW WE DECIDE, supra note 31, at 15, 17; see also CANADIAN
BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON HEALTH CARE REFORM, WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT?: HEALTH CARE
REFORM IN CANADA 37 (1994) (“A non-exhaustive review of provincial legislation reveals that provinces
simply classify services as “medically required” by regulation, without reference to any substantive or policy290
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as an ex post label applied to all noninsured services, rather than an ex ante
principled rationale for the exclusion of the service. Without definition and
resulting from political negotiation, the designation of a service as not
medically necessary carries many interpretations about the service, the needs it
serves, and the persons who posses such needs.
A service may be deemed medically unnecessary because it is not safe or
efficacious. In the case of clinic abortions, however, neither concern applies.
In Morgentaler, for example, Justice Beetz confirmed that “no medical
justification” required all therapeutic abortions to be performed in hospitals.294
On the contrary, according to expert testimony, “many first trimester abortions
may be safely performed in specialized clinics outside of hospitals . . . possible
complications can be handled, and in some cases better handled, by the
facilities of a specialized clinic.”295 Clinic services are now widely perceived
to offer more comprehensive, supportive, and better quality care than hospitals.
As in the case of Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, many Canadian women are
referred to clinic services by hospitals and other health providers. Denied
funding for clinic abortions services may thus impedes women’s access not
only to the service of their choice, but also the service to which many women
are referred in the course of seeking insured hospital services.296
When a service is both safe and effective, its designation as not medically
necessary may suggest that it serves neither a legitimate nor important medical
need.297 Clinic abortion services are often construed as serving mere
convenience rather than genuine medical need.298 The funding of mere
conveniences, it may be argued, would impose an unreasonable financial
burden on a public health system. Both private and public insurers have long
resisted coverage for sexual and reproductive health services for fear that
coverage will result in abuse of services and excessive claims.299 According to
based definition of that term . . . . While this procedure is flexible, it is arguably susceptible to political and
economic winds, as it does not seem to be grounded in any principled definition.”).
294 R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 115 (Can.).
295 Id.
296 See Cameron v. Nova Scotia, [1999] 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611, 650–51 (N.S. C.A.) (“If the decision to
deny coverage for a service turned solely on safety or lack or effectiveness, the case would be different. Here,
however, we are dealing with what was described by the experts as the treatment of choice, a treatment to
which the appellants were referred by their physicians in the course of providing them with insured services.”).
297 Giacomini et al., supra note 44, at 1493.
298 Clinic abortions, for example, are excluded under the Manitoba regulation along with tattoo removal,
vasectomy reversal, and weight loss programs—services that generate wide public agreement as to their
questionable medical necessity.
299 See Beh, supra note 278, at 119.
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Hazel Glenn Beh, insurers view coverage of sexual health services as a moral
hazard to be avoided “[b]ecause sexual activity is viewed as largely voluntary,
negative, and controllable conduct.”300 The Manitoba regulation challenged in
Jane Doe I reflects this longstanding tradition insofar as it is premised on the
belief that, with funded access, women will irrationally forgo forms of
contraception and excessively use clinic services. Unlike in the preMorgentaler era, there is no committee to ensure that lawful and available
abortions will not be abused.
The feared moral hazard of insuring clinic abortion services derives from
stereotypical assumptions about women’s capacity to responsibly engage in
sexual intercourse and to independently manage their reproductive health
needs. Evidence-based research strongly refutes these assumptions: “Women
undergoing repeat abortions are more likely than those undergoing a first
abortion to report using a method of contraception at the time of
conception . . . . There is little evidence to suggest that women seeking repeat
abortion are using pregnancy termination as a method of birth control.”301 As
Denise Réaume so aptly observed, denied access to benefits on the basis of a
false view that certain attributes renders one less worthy of those benefits “can
scarcely fail to be experienced as demeaning.”302 Moreover, many health
needs may be conceptualized as resulting from voluntary and controllable
conduct. Women often choose to become pregnant and carry their pregnancy
to term. In his dissenting opinion in Beal v. Doe,303 Justice Brennan of the
United States Supreme Court noted that “[a]bortion and childbirth, when
stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abortion
controversy, are simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with
pregnancy.”304 Nevertheless, unlike abortion, all provincial public health plans
insure prenatal, maternity, and neonatal intensive care without condition as to
where care is provided and despite their significantly greater cost as compared
to clinic abortions. Childbirth related services are not considered an
unreasonable burden on the public health system. To the contrary, pregnancy

300

Id. at 126.
William A. Fisher et al., Characteristics of Women Undergoing Repeat Induced Abortion, 172 CAN.
MED. ASS’N J. 637, 637 (2005).
302 Réaume, supra note 196, at 682.
303 432 U.S. 438, 448 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In this case, a majority of the Supreme Court held
that Pennsylvania’s Medicaid plan, which denied financial assistance for nontherapeutic abortions, did not
violate Title XIX of the Social Security Act or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 438.
304 Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
301
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is regarded by the Supreme Court of Canada as “not only the hope of future
generations but also the continuation of the species. It is difficult to imagine a
human condition that is more important to society.”305 It is held to bespeak the
obvious “[t]hat those who bear children and benefit society as a whole thereby
should not be economically or socially disadvantaged . . . . [I]t is unfair to
impose all of the costs of pregnancy upon one half of the population.”306
The inconsistent treatment of childbirth and abortion reflects an
unequivocal preference for continued pregnancy over its termination and for
women who continue their pregnancy over those who terminate it. This
preference derives from the “powerful ideology of motherhood—the belief that
motherhood is the natural, desired and ultimate goal of all ‘normal’ women.”307
Many women do experience pregnancy as a distinctive joy, but for many
others, pregnancy is a major health burden.308 Unfortunately, the regulation of
sexual and reproductive health has been historically characterized by the
disregard for individual women’s interests and a fidelity to stereotype as
truth.309 A public health insurance plan premised on the gendered norm of
motherhood significantly disadvantages women who sit outside the norm.
A biased and partial conception of women’s health needs also distorts costbenefit rationing analyses to the disadvantage of women. Fiscally responsible
decisions to list a service as an insured benefit arguably depend not only on
whether the treated condition is legitimate, but also whether the benefits of the
service are sufficiently important to justify public expenditure.310 To the
extent that conceived benefits of a service are premised on a partial
understanding of the health needs served, the costs of a service may appear
305 Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753, 769 (Can.). In this case, a majority
of the Supreme Court refused to impose a legal duty of care upon a pregnant woman toward her fetus when the
fetus is later born alive. The Court thus held that a mother cannot be held liable in tort for damages to her
child arising from a prenatal negligent act which caused injury to her fetus.
306 Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1243 (Can.).
307 Michelle Stanworth, The Deconstruction of Motherhood, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER,
MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 10, 15 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987).
308 REBECCA COOK, BERNARD DICKENS & MAHMOUD FATHALLA, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTEGRATING MEDICINE, ETHICS AND LAW 15 (2003).
309 See Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN
LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 43 (1995).
310 Recall that under the Health Services Insurance Act, even “medically required” services could be
excluded as an insured benefit if “excepted by the regulations.” See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
The claimed purpose of the Manitoba regulation, however, is to strengthen the publicly funded health care
system through effective and efficient delivery of care. In order for an exclusion of a service to be consistent
with the claimed purpose and scheme of the impugned law, it must be justifiable according to some efficiency
(cost-benefit) analysis.
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unduly high. An assessment of the salient benefits of in vitro fertilization
(IVF) provides an example. In their recent study, Mita Giacomini and her coauthors observed that IVF is often only assessed as a treatment to produce
pregnancies.311 This perspective disregards the alternative benefits that IVF
can provide as a diagnostic technology even when it fails to produce a
pregnancy. IVF may offer “unique insight into the couple’s reproductive
function . . . . This additional diagnostic information and emotional closure
can potentially benefit the woman’s physical health by obviating further
infertility interventions.”312 A fuller understanding of the benefits of
reproductive health services was similarly evidenced in Cameron, in which
Justice Chipman rejected the argument that medically necessary services
require so-called “medical ends.”313 He reasoned that “[t]he goal of medical
treatment is surely not so narrowly defined.”314 Rather, a range of ends or
outcomes may be appropriately associated with genuine medical need given
that “the end of all medical treatment is to improve the quality of life.”315 He
thus concluded that a distinction between medical and other immediate ends is
a “distinction without much, if any, difference.”316
A narrow conception of abortion as terminating the unwanted physical state
of pregnancy, similar to a narrow conception of IVF and other fertility
treatments, undervalues the full benefits of the service.317 According to an
internationally endorsed definition, “[R]eproductive health is a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of
disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its
functions and processes.”318 The burdens of pregnancy, postpartum recovery,
nursing, and the care of dependent children can significantly diminish
opportunities necessary for women to maintain and promote their physical,
311

Giacomini et al., supra note 44, at 1492.
Id.
313 Cameron v. Nova Scotia, [1999] 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611, 634 (N.S. C.A.).
314 Id. at 634.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 This is not to suggest that the physical consequences of pregnancy alone are not serious. Pregnancy
carries physical pain and additional risks during labor, postnatal physical disability, and additional physical
disability during pregnancy, when many women find it necessary to sleep as much as fifteen hours a day
and/or vomit daily for months on end, and others are confined to bed or hospital for weeks or months because
of toxemia (which can be fatal), premature labor, or other complications. Pregnancy also entails discomforts
such as varicose veins, hemorrhoids, rectal bleeding, fainting, and excessive swelling. Rebecca J. Cook &
Bernard M. Dickens, The Injustice of Unsafe Motherhood, 2 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 64, 67 (2002).
318 Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Platform for Action and
Beijing Declaration, para. 94.
312
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emotional, economic, and social well-being. The decision to terminate a
pregnancy is typically motivated by diverse and interrelated considerations
respecting these different forms of well-being.
A woman may be motivated to seek an abortion because of her emotional
unpreparedness to assume or resume motherhood responsibilities or her
existing obligations to care for dependants. Women who seek repeat abortions
are more likely to report physical abuse by a male partner or a history of sexual
violence. Fear for her own safety, and that of a newborn child, may lead a
woman to terminate her pregnancy.319 The associated costs of continued
pregnancy or childbirth may undermine a woman’s attempts to become
economically stable and may prevent her from providing adequate nutrition,
housing, clothing, and sanitation for herself, existing family members, and a
newborn child. While negative outcomes of adolescent childbearing cannot be
generalized,320 evidence indicates that, as compared to women who delay
childbearing, adolescent mothers are less likely to complete high school and
more likely to experience single parenthood and high levels of poverty.321 The
full physical, psychological, and social benefits of preventing and controlling
the timing of pregnancy are recognizable only when assessed from the many
perspectives of differently situated women.
Moreover, the denial of public funding for a service distinctive to women’s
health needs demonstrates a disregard for the poor economic and social
conditions under which many Canadian women live. In 2003, more than 1.5
million Canadian women lived in poverty.322 Women also represent a
disproportionate share of the population in Canada with low incomes.323 This
class of poor and low income women is itself disproportionately composed of
lone-parent mothers, women with disabilities, and aboriginal/First Nations,
visible minority, and immigrant women.324 Exclusion of clinic abortion
services from the Manitoba Health Insurance Plan thus forces not simply
women, but women already facing multiple and compounding forms of
319

See Fisher et al., supra note 301, at 638.
Mary Bissell, Socio-economic Outcomes of Teen Pregnancy and Parenthood: A Review of the
Literature, 9 CAN. J. HUM. SEXUALITY 191, 202 (2000).
321 Id.
322 MONICA TOWNSON, POVERTY ISSUES FOR CANADIAN WOMEN: BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (2005),
http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/resources/consultations/ges09-2005/poverty_e.pdf.
323 In 2003, 1.9 million females, 12% of the total female population, lived in an after-tax low-income
situation. STATISTICS CAN., WOMEN IN CANADA: A GENDER-BASED STATISTICAL REPORT 143 (5th ed. 2006),
http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/89-503-XIE/0010589-503-XIE.pdf.
324 TOWNSON, supra note 322, at 3–4.
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discrimination and disadvantage, to return to overburdened hospital providers
or delay receiving care until they can obtain required funds.
Exclusion of clinic abortion services under the Manitoba Health Insurance
Plan based on gender stereotype and a partial assessment of their benefits
reflects a lack of concern for women’s distinctive health needs and
circumstances. In Auton, the Supreme Court held that “[if] a benefit program
excludes a particular group in a way that undercuts the overall purpose of the
program, then it is likely to be discriminatory.”325 To the extent that the stated
purpose of the Manitoba regulation is to strengthen the health care system
through effective and efficient public funding, the exclusion of clinic abortion
services on the basis of a partial or biased assessment of their benefits, and of
the needs and circumstances of women may lead to an inaccurate efficiency
assessment, and thereby undermine rather than promote the legislative object.
To the extent that the purpose of the Manitoba Health Services Insurance Plan
is to protect, promote, and restore the health of provincial residents without
financial barriers, the exclusion of clinic services defeats this objective. As
Judge Oliphant noted in Jane Doe I, “[T]here is no reason or logic behind the
impugned legislation which prevents women from having access to therapeutic
abortions in a timely way.”326
The selective exclusion of women’s
reproductive health services, without reason or logic, sends a powerful
message that the health of women is less important than the health of others;
that women are not equally deserving of public support and expenditure.
C. The Nature and Scope of the Interest Affected by the Exclusion of Clinic
Abortion as an Insured Service Under a “Universally Accessible, Publicly
Funded Health System”
The nature and scope of the interest affected by the challenged law is an
important consideration in the discrimination inquiry. Differential treatment
that “restricts access to a fundamental social institution, or affects ‘a basic
aspect of full membership in Canadian society’” communicates by definition a
message of exclusion and inferiority.327 As Denise Réaume observed, “[T]here
are some benefits or opportunities, some institutions or enterprises, which are

325

Auton v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, 681 (Can.).
Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba (Jane Doe I), [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547, 563 (Man. Q.B.).
327 Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 540 (Can.) (citing Justice L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Egan v. Canada,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 556 (Can.)).
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so important that denying participation in them implies the lesser worth of
those excluded.”328
The discriminatory caliber of a law that excludes a service from public
health insurance is not fully captured in the individual economic or health
consequences of denied funding. Attention must be paid to the more intangible
and invidious societal level harms that flow from the exclusion.329 The
indignity of the law resides in the broader message conveyed by denied
participation in a fundamental social institution, Canada’s universally
accessible, publicly funded health system—a claimed right of citizenship.
In Canada, Medicare refers to a national health care system composed of
provincially administered health insurance plans jointly funded by the
provincial and federal governments. The Manitoba Health Services Insurance
Plan is one part of this larger institution. Medicare was created to ensure
universal, comprehensive, and accessible health care for all Canadians.
In 1947, Saskatchewan adopted Canada’s first universal health insurance
plan, which “provided for an almost complete range of hospital services as
benefits.”330 Other provinces soon followed, and in 1957, the federal
government complemented provincial plans with a national insurance program
for hospital services.331 Under the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services
Act,332 the federal government partially financed all provincial insurance plans
that provided universal coverage for hospital services.333 In 1966, under the
Medical Care Act,334 this cost-sharing program was extended to include
physician care as recommended by the Royal Commission on Health Services
(1964).335 Medicare was thus born. A desire to extend the benefits of medical
technology to the Canadian community as a whole motivated the
Commission’s recommendation for a comprehensive program:
The field of health care services illustrates, perhaps better than any
other, a paradox of our age, which is, of course, the enormous gap
328

Réaume, supra note 196, at 688.
See Egan, [1995] 2 S.C.R. at 557 (“To summarize, tangible economic consequences are but one
manifestation of the more intangible and invidious harms flowing from discrimination, which the Charter
seeks to root out.”).
330 Id. at 102.
331 See Stephen J. Kunitz, Socialism and Social Insurance in the United States and Canada, in CANADIAN
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between our scientific knowledge and skills on the one hand, and our
organizational and financial arrangements to apply them to the needs
of men, on the other . . . . What the Commission recommends is that
in Canada this gap be closed. That as a nation we now take the
necessary legislative, organizational and financial decisions to make
all the fruits of the health sciences available to all our residents
336
without hindrance of any kind.

Medicare was thus premised from its conception on a presumptive entitlement
of equal access to the benefits of scientific knowledge and skill—a national
commitment to meet the health needs of community members without
discrimination.
In the 1970s, extra billing and user charges led to a public outcry and a
second Royal Commission on Health Services. In its 1980 report, the
Commission concluded that private payment requirements impeded access to
comprehensive and universal health care, and thus undermined the intent and
purpose of Medicare.337 In an effort to revive Medicare, the federal
government adopted the Canada Health Act.338 The Act states that the
“primary objective of Canadian health care policy is to protect, promote and
restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of Canada and to
facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other
barriers.”339 It establishes criteria and conditions that provincial health
insurance plans must satisfy in order for provinces to qualify for the full
federal cash contribution.340 Pursuant to the Act, publicly administered health
insurance plans must ensure that all “medically required” services rendered by
a medical practitioner are universally accessible to all Canadian citizens
without income barriers across the provinces.
The Canada Health Act reaffirmed a commitment to the principles of
interdependence, collective responsibility, and shared risk:
[A] civilized and wealthy nation, such as ours, should not make the
sick bear the financial burden of health care . . . . The misfortune of

336
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SPECIAL COMM’R TO REVIEW THE STATE OF HEALTH SERVS. IN CAN., CANADA’S NATIONALPROVINCIAL HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM FOR THE 1980’S: A COMMITMENT FOR RENEWAL, 1980, at 27, 42
(1979).
338 R.S.C 1985, ch. C-6.
339 Canada Health Act, R.S.C 1985, ch. C-6, § 3.
340 § 4.
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accessibility. § 7.
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illness which at some time touches each one of us is burden enough:
341
the costs of care should be borne by society as a whole.

As further articulated by Robert Evans, under the Canadian health care system,
[i]llness [is treated] as primarily the result of natural or social
malevolence rather than personal default . . . in this domain, the
individual is not responsible for his own misfortunes . . . . We are all
equal when faced with disease or death, and our institutions reflect
342
that sense of equality.

Medicare—founded on principles of equity, fairness and solidarity—is thus a
quintessential symbol of community. It reflects a shared faith that the needs of
individuals will be met through collective commitment and mutual obligation.
It exhibits an equal concern for the health and well-being of all members of
Canadian society. In this sense, although Medicare is neither a legal obligation
of government nor a legal right of citizens,343 it is a fundamental social
institution. Canadians have come to embrace it as “a national symbol and a
defining aspect of their citizenship.”344 For many, Canada’s “[u]niversal
publicly funded health care is part of what it means to be a Canadian.”345
“Equality before the health-care system” is thus not only as important but
equivalent to “equality before the law.346
The exclusion of clinic abortion services, and by extension the women who
require them, from a fundamental institution of community membership
necessarily implies the lesser worth of those excluded. A “movement away
from the solidarity principles underlying social insurance”347 and the
imposition of individual responsibility treats unintended pregnancy as the
consequence of personal default undeserving of public support. The fact that
unintended pregnancy is a reproductive and sexual health need distinctive to
women suggests that women themselves are undeserving of equal respect,
341
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Robert G. Evans, “We’ll Take Care of It for You”: Health Care in the Canadian Community, 117
DAEDALUS 155, 164–65, 169 (1988).
343 The Canada Health Act is a spending statute that does not expressly establish any rights or duties.
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concern, and consideration. A government’s selective divestment from the
health of women translates into a selective divestment from women
themselves.348
IV. DEMONSTRABLE JUSTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 1
Under section 1 of the Charter, rights and freedoms are guaranteed “subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.”349 A law that infringes section
15(1) may thus still be constitutional if the government demonstrates that the
infringement satisfies the requirements of section 1.
Under the framework developed by the Supreme Court in R. v. Oakes,350
section 1 requires that the objective of the law be “pressing and substantial”
and that the means chosen to attain this objective be reasonable and
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.351 The latter
requirement is satisfied where (1) the means are “rationally connected” to the
objective; (2) the means minimally impair the guaranteed right; and (3) the
effect of the law is proportional to its objective, such that the benefits of the
law outweigh its deleterious effects.352 While this Article primarily concerns
the conception of the right violated by denied funding for clinic services, this
part briefly examines the advantages of a community-membership model of
equality under a section 1 analysis.
In Jane Doe I, Judge Oliphant held that the Manitoba regulation “cannot be
saved by [section] 1 of the Charter.”353 He rejected the government’s
characterization of the regulation and asserted that its real objective “was to
keep . . . persons, out of the business of operating a free-standing clinic that
provides therapeutic abortions in the Province of Manitoba.”354 This objective
was deemed insufficiently important to override constitutionally protected
rights. Judge Oliphant further reasoned that the means chosen to attain the

348
349
350
351
352
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Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 138.
Jane Doe 1 v. Manitoba, [2004] 248 D.L.R. (4th) 547, 564 (Man. Q.B.).
Id. at 564–65.
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claimed objective were neither “rational nor fair” and were “out of proportion
to the objective.”355
It is exceptionally rare for a Canadian court to hold that an impugned law
lacks a “pressing and substantial” objective.356 This is particularly true in the
health care context. Governments have consistently argued, and courts have
largely accepted, that exclusions under provincial health insurance plans are
intended to protect the financial sustainability of Medicare. The Manitoba
government defended its policy in Jane Doe I precisely on these grounds.
Under section 1, Courts exercise considerable deference regarding government
allocations of scarce resources within social programs on the basis of
institutional competence and political accountability.357 As explained by
Donna Greschner and Steven Lewis, “government departments are better
equipped than courts to manage complex programs . . . [T]hey have far more
[available data and expertise] . . . than judges do, and more practice at using
it.”358 Governments also have the advantage of perspective. They “must
consider the needs of all patients, compare the sometimes incommensurable,
and make often tragic trade-offs.”359 In Cameron, for example, while the
exclusion of infertility treatments was held to infringe section 15(1), the
violation was justified as a reasonable limit under section 1. The Court stated
that “policy makers require latitude in balancing competing interests in the
constrained financial environment. We are simply not equipped to sort out the
priorities.”360
Members of the Supreme Court have nevertheless warned against
deference becoming abdication.361 Although the administration of health care
systems resides with provincial governments,
the resulting legislation, like all laws, is subject to constitutional
limits . . . . The fact that the matter is complex, contentious or laden
355
356
357

Id.
PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 743 (2001).
Sheilah Martin, Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals, 80 CAN. BAR REV. 299, 348

(2001).
358 Donna Greschner & Steven Lewis, Auton and Evidence-Based Decision Making: Medicare in the
Courts, 82 CAN. BAR REV. 501, 507 (2003).
359 Id.
360 Cameron v. Nova Scotia, [1999] 177 D.L.R. (4th) 611, 667 (N.S. C.A.).
361 See RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, 332 (Can.). “[C]are
must be taken not to extend the notion of deference too far. Deference must not be carried to the point of
relieving the government of the burden which the Charter places upon it of demonstrating that the limits it has
imposed on guaranteed rights are reasonable and justifiable . . . . The courts are no more permitted to abdicate
their responsibility than is Parliament.” Id.
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with social values does not mean that the courts can abdicate the
responsibility vested in them by our Constitution to review
362
legislation for Charter compliance . . . .

Given the lack of evidence of a colourable intention in Jane Doe I, a reviewing
Court would likely regard the rationing objective as “pressing and substantial.”
The government faces a greater challenge, however, respecting the means
chosen to attain this objective. The average cost of a clinic abortion is
significantly less than the average costs of a hospital abortion or maternal care
and childbirth. This fact alone challenges the rational connection between the
government’s fiscal objective and the exclusion of clinic services. In his
opinion in Lexogest I, Justice Huband of the Manitoba Court of Appeal
focused on the perversity of the scheme:
If an abortion could be provided at less cost at a hospital than a freestanding clinic, it would make eminently good sense and would be
entirely within the spirit of the Act to require that they be performed
in the hospitals as a prerequisite to coverage. But the opposite
appears to be the case . . . . It is perverse that an insurance scheme
363
designed to control costs should willfully increase them.

A section 15(1) analysis premised on the dignity of equal community
membership may also prove especially valuable in demonstrating the
disproportionate effect of the Manitoba regulation as compared to its objective.
This model of equality captures more than tangible economic costs or health
risks. It recognizes the full social significance of exclusion in terms of
women’s self-respect and self-worth as members of Canadian society. A law
that relegates persons to a lesser status—less capable, less worthy, less
deserving than others—requires exceptionally strong countervailing reasons to
justify its reasonableness in a free and democratic society.
CONCLUSION
The guarantee of equality under the Charter requires a perspective that
extends beyond affected individuals or groups. It requires a perspective that
encompasses the actions of others and the broader context of social interaction.
It requires a perspective that critically evaluates the construction of social and
political institutions that define membership in a community. What are the
362
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legal rules of membership? Do they signify or construct individuals or groups
as less capable, less worthy, or less deserving of equal respect, concern, and
consideration?
For too long, the mere physical fact of pregnancy—the unique capacity to
reproduce—justified the discriminatory treatment of women. Justification for
differential treatment monopolized the analysis. Too little attention was paid
to the effect of differential treatment—the impact of excluding women from
social institutions on the basis of the sexual and reproductive health needs.
This Article focuses on the burden of unequal treatment rather than its
justification.
In Jane Doe I, Judge Oliphant characterized the discriminatory effect of the
Manitoba regulation in strongly individualist terms. The indignity of denied
public funding for clinic abortion services was located in the loss of women’s
freedom, autonomy, and self-determination. Under a model of equality
premised on the dignity of equal community membership, the impact of the
Manitoba regulation is differently conceived. The discriminatory effects of the
law extend to women as members of the community. Women are excluded
from a fundamental social institution, and thereby denied a right of citizenship.
Women are treated as less capable, less deserving, and less worthy of equal
concern, respect, and consideration. More significantly, if the law is
sufficiently powerful, its claims of inferiority may be internalized and accepted
as true by women themselves. The law thus not only affects the perception of
others. On the contrary, its most powerful discriminatory impact is in
women’s diminished self-worth and self-respect.
Access to reproductive and sexual health services is therefore inseparable
from the larger project of women’s political, economic, and social equality. If
women are to be equal members of Canadian society, the Charter must be
interpreted and applied in fulfillment of a broader commitment to transform
social and political institutions—including our health care system—in an
egalitarian direction wherein women are not only perceived as full members of
Canadian society, but believe themselves to be.
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